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The advent of multiparty democracy in 1993 heralded the dawn of the prominence of 
administrative law and administrative justice on the constitutional landscape of Malawi. 
Existing literature has documented the growing importance of administrative law and judicial 
review of administrative action in Malawi since 1992.1 This literature suggests that over the 
past two decades judicial review has become an important tool for testing the compatibility of 
the actions of government agencies with the Constitution. It attributes this to the political 
transition to multiparty democracy which had its genesis around 1992. 
The increasing importance of administrative law in environmental governance has also been 
documented in existing literature. Glazewiski, an eminent environmental law scholar has 
described environmental law as administrative law in action.2 He attributes this to the fact that 
environmental rule-making, rule-application and rule-adjudication primarily involve “state 
structures, processes and officials.”3 Administrative decision-making by environmental 
agencies is one of the primary concerns of administrative law.4  
The development and implementation of environmental law essentially involves 
administrative decision-making within the context of environmental agencies.5 These 
agencies are also given the responsibility of initiating and promulgating environmental 
regulations.  Administrative decision-making is thus the primary mode of implementing and 
enforcing environmental law.  
It is generally believed that administrative law is a useful tool for good environmental 
governance. However, one issue that remains underexplored is whether the principles of 
administrative law are reflected in the daily operations of environmental agencies. There is a 
dearth of empirical research to assess the validity of the above dominant understanding, 
especially in the environmental context. No empirical research has been done to determine the 
                                                          
1 Matembo Nzunda (1998), “The Quickening of Judicial Control of Administrative Action in Malawi, 1992-
1994” in Kings M Phiri and Kenneth R Ross, Democratization in Malawi A Stocktaking ( Kachere), pp 283-315. 
2 Jan Glazewski (2000), Environmental Law in South Africa, (Butterworths) p97. 
3 L. J. Kotze (2004), The Application of Just Administrative Action in the South African Environmental 
Governance Sphere: An Analysis of Some Contemporary Thoughts and Recent Jurisprudence, P.E.R., Volume 
7(2), p. 64. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid p. 59. 
4 
 
impact of administrative law generally and judicial review on the quality of environmental 
rule-making, application and adjudication in Malawi.   
Some literature has attempted to explain the increase of judicial review in the post-1992 era.6 
However, there has been no attempt to analyse the qualitative significance of judicial review 
across a broad spectrum of decision making bodies ranging from environmental agencies to 
revenue authorities to local government. Similarly, no attempt has been made to try to 
understand the impact of the quickening of judicial review on the work of administrative 
agencies, including environmental agencies. Even attempts to understand the quickening of 
judicial review have not been empirically grounded.  
The dearth of empirical research on the impact of judicial review is not surprising given that, 
globally, there is very little empirical evidence to support the accuracy of dominant 
understandings around the role of administrative law and judicial review. Much of what is 
known about the impact of judicial review on the decision-making culture within government 
is based on anecdotal evidence.7  
Against this backdrop, this paper examines the operations of administrative law in the 
environmental sphere and how its mechanisms influence the ways in which environmental 
agencies function.  
1.2. Study objectives 
This study has the following objectives: 
(a) To determine how environmental agencies in Malawi make, apply rules and adjudicate 
disputes. 
(b) To establish the nature and forms of public participation in environmental agency 
rulemaking, decision making and adjudication processes. 
(c) To determine the role and impact of judicial review, parliamentary intervention and 
presidential oversight on the conduct of environmental agencies in the delivery of 
administrative justice. 
(d) To suggest policy and legislative interventions that can help mainstream the principles 
and policies of administrative law in the conduct of environmental agencies. 
1.4. A theoretical framework for Administrative Law and environmental governance 
                                                          
6 Phiri and Ross, supra, note 1. 
7 Ross Cranston (1994) , ‘ Reviewing Judicial Review, ‘ in G. Richardson and H. Genn(eds.) Administrative 
Law and Government Action, pp 72-73. 
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1.4.1. Administrative Law and environmental governance 
Bradley and Ewing, define administrative law as “the branch of law concerned with the 
composition, procedures, powers, duties, rights and liabilities of government that are engaging 
in administering public policies.”8 This branch of law governs relations between government 
agencies and between government agencies and private entities/individuals that are affected 
by the power and duties of such agencies.9 Key activities of public agencies are generally 
directed or constrained by administrative law. These include rule-making, rule-application 
and rule-adjudication. Specific government actions that are shaped by administrative law 
include, making rules and regulations, issuance of orders, and granting of licences as well as 
permits.10One of the key functions of administrative law is to ensure that the responsibilities 
and operations of public agencies are provided for and supported by law.  
 It has been argued that administrative law can play a critical role in the realisation of “good 
administration, the rule of law and meaningful democracy in African countries, including 
Malawi.11 This is because administrative law is considered to be a valuable tool for ensuring 
that individual interactions with public officials are characterised by legality, fairness, 
impartiality, procedural propriety and respect for human rights generally. Through Judicial 
review, administrative law empowers courts to check whether the actions of public agencies 
are confined within the scope of their authorizing laws and fundamental principles of 
administrative law.  
Administrative law is also believed to be a catalyst of better decision-making beyond 
individual cases and has been said to be a stimulant for broader and systemic improvements in 
decision making.12 In this regard, administrative law is said to be an invaluable tool for 
improving ‘the quality and consistency of government decision-making,’ and for shaping ‘the 
way decision-makers exercise their functions.’13 Administrative law is also believed to be a 
                                                          
8 A.W Bradley and K.D. Ewing (2007), Constitutional and Administrative Law, (Pearson Education Ltd), p657. 
9 Bradley and Ewing, p657-658. 
10 Cary Coglianese (2016) Administrative Law: The US and Beyond, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 
Public Law Research Paper No. 16-20. Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818505 
11 Migai Akech (2013), Administrative Law and Governance in East Africa (Proposal for IDRC Research Grant).  
12 Prof. John McMillian (2009), Can Administrative Law Foster Good Administration, (The Whetmore Lecture), 





tool for promoting public trust in government and public officers because it requires public 
officials to abide by their promises.14  
However, from a methodological perspective, it is extremely difficult to determine the impact 
of administrative law on the practical operations of public agencies. This is because factors 
that inform and influence governance are complex, multiple and multifaceted. The task of 
determining how administrative law impacts on governance is made particularly complex by 
the profound changes that are taking place in the sphere of governance in most countries.  
Contemporary administrative law and governance is increasingly characterised by what 
Jayasuriya terms ‘decentring’.15 Decentring, according to him, happens “when governance is 
located in multiple sites, engage a number of non-state actors, and deploys a range of 
techniques of governance that move beyond the traditional structures of public law.”16 The 
realities of modern government are such that state power is sometimes exercised or at least 
influenced by entities outside traditional branches of government. As Jayasuriya argues, “the 
exercise of public power is now taking place in sites outside the formal structures of 
governmental power, a process which decentres and fragments the state.”17 This suggests that 
formal institutions are gradually losing their monopoly over rule making, application and 
adjudication. Entities outside the formal structures of governmental power including, public-
private partnerships (PPPs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), development partners, 
political parties, vigilantes and other non-state actors are increasingly becoming involved in 
the exercise of state power. Accountability machinery also exists “outside formal state 
institutions.”18 Ironically, these entities are not subjected to administrative law. As Sedley 
observes, “with the systematic dispersal of the sites of power beyond the confines of what we 
had learned to recognise as the state, old certainties of public law are no longer there.”19 This 
renders it extremely difficult to determine the extent to which the operations of public 
agencies are influenced by administrative law or other external factors.  
                                                          
14 Akech, p4. 
15 Kanishka Jayasuriya (2007), Riding on the Accountability Wave?  Politics of Global Administrative Law, 








This paper will, however, offer insights from field work on the application of administrative 
to environmental governance. It will also shed light how administrative law is shaping 
environmental governance in the Malawian context.  
1.4.2. Public participation in environmental management 
Reed defines participation as “as a process where individuals, groups and organisations 
choose to take an active role in making decisions that affect them.”20 There is a general 
consensus that public participation is an integral part of environmental decision-making, 
environmental justice and participatory democracy.21 This is especially because 
environmental management, generally, embraces complex and uncertain issues which are of 
concern to a multiplicity of actors including government agencies, public-spirited citizens, 
specific interest groups as well as the general public.22  
The principle of public participation is premised on the fact that effective development and 
implementation of environmental law and policy is dependent on the participation of the 
governed in rule making, rule application and rule adjudication.23 From a pragmatic 
perspective public participation is considered important because it is regarded as a tool for 
improving the quality of rule-making, rule-application and rule-adjudication. This is because 
participation exposes decision-maker to a diversity of knowledge, views and perspectives.24 
Consequently, rule makers, implementers and adjudicators are exposed to a wide range of 
environmental perspectives and are able to direct their mind to many relevant considerations.    
The importance of public participation in environmental decision-making has been stressed in 
a number of international instruments and domestic instruments. These include Principle 10 of 
the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development which enshrines the principle of 
public participation in environmental governance. Principle 10 highlights the fact that 
“environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at 
relevant levels.”  The Malawi National Environmental Policy also stresses the importance of 
public participation in environmental decision-making. Specifically, it emphasizes the role of 
                                                          
20 Mark Reed (2005), Stakeholder participation for Environmental Management: A Literature Review, Biological 
Conservation, Vol.141, 2417-2431.2418. 
21Neil F. Papovic (1993), The Right to Participate in Decisions that Affect the Environment, 10 Pace 
Environmental Law Review, 683; A. du Plessis (2008) ,Public Participation, Good Environmental Governance 
and Fulfilment of Environmental Rights, PER (2), p2. 
22R.E Fuggle and M.A. Rabbie, 2000, Environment Management in South Africa, (Juta and Co.), p99 
23 Maurice Sunkin  and David Ong (2002), Source Book on Environmental Law, (Cavendish Publishing), p 33. 
24 Mark Reed (2005), Stakeholder participation for Environmental Management: A Literature Review,  
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“public participation as a tool for consensus building and for strengthening public support for 
environmental decisions.”25 
Commentators have also highlighted the benefits of public participation in environmental 
rulemaking, rule application and adjudication.26 Chinsinga, for example, notes that involving 
communities in policy decisions at the design stage exposes policy and rule makers to local 
level knowledge. It also enables policy-makers to appreciate the community-level policy 
goals and incentives while allowing them to factor in their own.27 Apart from leading to the 
formulation of more appropriate and effective policy, public participation in policy and rule-
making creates a sense of ownership and legitimacy of the resultant rules. This effectively 
enhances the chances of compliance. 28 Scholars also contend that participation also helps to 
legitimize environmental related-decisions taken by public officials. This in turn enhances the 
prospects of compliance with resultant decisions. 29 As observed by Russel and Dobson, 
institutions that engage the active support and /or leadership of communities have a greater 
chance of achieving social acceptance and adherence to regulations than those which do not.30  
 
However, there is little empirical evidence in the Malawian context to support most of the 
above claims. In practice, it is not clear how the space for participation is created and who 
creates it. It is not always clear who sets the agenda and defines the objectives as well as 
parameters of participation. It is also not clear how the problems are framed and how the 
stakeholders are identified. The criteria for inclusion and exclusion are not always clear. The 
barriers to effective participation are also not well understood. This paper accordingly 
presents evidence from empirical research that provides some insights on the above issues.  
Moreover, the potential impact of public participation on environmental decision-making is 
largely dependent on its nature, quality and process. The degrees of public participation may 
range from what Reed terms “passive dissemination of information” or “manipulation,” and   
                                                          
25 Paragraph 4.6(b) 
26 J. Ebbesson, (1997), The Notion of Public Participation in International Environmental Law,  8 Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law, 51-97; Sunkin and Ong, p744. 
27 Chinsinga B (2005), The Clash of Voices: Community –Based Targeting of Safety-net interventions in 
Malawi, Social Policy and Administration, 39(3) 284-301. 
28CEPA, ( 2010), Report of Land and Agrarian Reform in Malawi, Available at: www.cepamw.com (Accessed 
18/03/2014). 
29Ibid, p101 
30Aaron J.M Russel and Tracy Dobson (2011), Chiefs as Critical Partners for Decentralized Governance of 




“mere tokenism,” to active stakeholder engagement or “citizen control.”31 Commentators 
have also distinguished “functional”, “instrumental” or consultative participation from 
participation that is “transformative”.32 Transformative participation has also been described 
as participation that is characterised by meaningful engagement of stakeholders in the rule 
making, rule application and adjudication processes. In Schubart Park Residents Association 
and others v City of Tshwane,33the South African Constitutional Court held that “many 
provisions in the Constitution require the substantive involvement and engagement of people 
in decisions that may affect their lives.”34  Transformative participation is form of 
participation is preferred over other forms because it enables stakeholders contribute to the 
transformation of policies, rules, structures and institutions.  
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration spells out the prerequisites for effective 
participation.35These include appropriate access to environmental information, public 
awareness and access to judicial and administrative proceedings. Accordingly, Principle 10 
urges States to promote and stimulate public awareness and participation through ensuring 
that information is widely available. The principle also urges States to provide “effective 
access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy.” Principle 10 
also highlights effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, as well as effective 
redress and remedies as critical prerequisites for public participation.  
A review of the existing literature indicates that there are a number of barriers to effective 
participation in environmental rule making, rule application and rule adjudication.  These 
include legal illiteracy, high science, and commercial confidentiality. Public participation can 
also be hampered by methodological, procedural and political challenges.36In this context, 
scholars have noted the limited involvement of local people and institutions in policy 
development and implementation as a serious barrier to local level environmental 
management.37 The tendency to assume that traditional leaders are representatives of rural 
communities and guardians of their interests have also been highlighted a barrier to 
                                                          
31Mark Reed (2005), Stakeholder participation for Environmental Management: A Literature Review;  
IDS (2003), p2419. 
32 Mark Reed, p2419. 
33 [2012] ZACC 26. 
34 Page 20 of the transcript. Available at: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2012/26.pdf 
35Article 19 (2007), Access to Information: An Instrumental Right for Empowerment , (Article 19 , London and 
ADC)http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/ati-empowerment-right.pdf 
36 IDS (2003), Public Participation and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, (A review for DFID and GEF), p22, 
35. 
37 J. Kamoto, G. Clarkson and D. Shepherd (2013), Doing More Harm than Good? Community Based Natural 




meaningful engagement.38 This study, therefore, set out to examine at a more in-depth level 
the nature and forms of public participation in environmental governance in Malawi. 
1.4.3. Judicial review and its impact 
Judicial review by definition refers to the supervisory power of courts over the way public 
bodies exercise their powers and carry outs their duties.39 The focus of judicial review is not 
on overturning decisions of public authorities that judges are uncomfortable with. Rather than 
consider merits of a particular decisions, judicial review primarily examines the process of 
decision-making to ascertain that decisions have been validly taken in compliance with the 
law.40  At common law, the broad grounds for challenging decisions of public authorities 
were outlined by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil 
Service.41  These are ‘illegality’, ‘irrationality’ and ‘procedural impropriety’. Illegality refers 
to failure to comply with statutory powers and duties; irrationality means failure to arrive at 
rational decisions or to follow a proper process of reasoning.42 Procedural impropriety, on the 
other hand embraces failure to comply with the common law duty to be fair and the principles 
associated with it. 
Most judicial review cases primarily focus on administrative action. Section 43 of the 
Constitution provides for a right to lawful and procedurally fair administrative action. 
However, the Malawi Constitution does not define “administrative action.” Nonetheless, it 
empowers courts to have regard to comparable foreign case law when interpreting its 
provisions. 43 In this regard, recourse can be had to South African case law that interpreted 
section 33 of the Constitution which identical to section 43. Administrative action by 
definition refers to tasks of public officers that are public and administrative in nature.44 These 
actions include “adjudicative administrative decisions, regulations, legislation and 
                                                          
38 J.F Kamoto et al, p8 
39 The Judge Over Your Shoulders (2nd Edn. 1994), p4 
40 Le Sueur and Sunkin (1998), p469. 
41 [1985] 1 AC 374. 
42 Le Sueur and Sunkin (1998), p469. 
43 Section 11(c) of the Constitution. 
44 President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union, 2000 (1)SA 1 (CC) ; Fedsure 
Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transnational Metropolitan Council and Others, 1999 
(1) SA 374. 
11 
 
administrative decisions made by the executive branch of government.”45 They may also 
include, passing of resolutions and implementation of legislation.46 
It is widely believed that judicial review of agency rule-making, application and adjudication 
serves the public interest by helping to improve the quality of decision-making.47This is 
especially because it is regarded as a useful tool for holding public officials accountable to 
aggrieved parties and the wider public.48 Within the context of rule-making commentators 
note that judicial review operates as an institutional mechanism that guarantees that public 
authorities provide requisite information to interested parties, and take the views of interested 
parties seriously and make well-reasoned decisions.49 This in turn encourages transparency 
and openness. The realisation that decisions of public officers will be scrutinised and may be 
amenable to challenge forces public officers to be accountable and helps them to enhance the 
quality of their decision-making.50 Judicial review is also regarded as a valuable tool for 
guaranteeing that agencies confine their discretion, application and interpretation of the rules 
within reasonable bounds. 51 It serves as a reminder to public authorities that “there is an 
institution that can intervene to review” their decisions.52 Consequently, they are compelled to 
operate within the law and avoid arbitrary or capricious actions.   
While commentators have examined the impact of judicial decision-making in specific 
instances, they have seldom considered the legal, policy or administrative changes that are 
effected in administrative agencies following judicial review.53 Growing evidence suggests 
that what happens in practice might not reflect the above conventional wisdom that judicial 
review necessarily results in improvement of the quality of decision-making. To this end, a 
number of administrative law scholars highlight the fact that judicial review sometimes tends 
to result in unintended consequences. Specifically, they note that judicial review has a 
tendency to impact more on administrative systems’, official defensiveness and bureaucratic 
behaviour than the quality of decision-making. These scholars note that contrary to 
                                                          
45 Kotze, p68 
46 President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union, 2000 (1)SA 1 (CC) ; Fedsure 
Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transnational Metropolitan Council and Others, 1999 
(1) SA 374. 
47 Wendy Wagner (2012),  “Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rule-makings: An Empirical 
Investigation,” 53 William and Mary Law Review 1717. 
48 Ibid, p1723. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Sunkin and Ong, p 743.  
51 ibid, 1724. 
52 Ibid, 1756. 
53 Skelly Wright (1977), New Judicial Requisites for Informal Rule-making: Implications for the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Process, 29(1) Administrative Law Review, pp59-64. 
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conventional wisdom, judicial review might unwittingly encourage “more formal and more 
cumbersome procedures.”54 It might also incentivise agencies to compromise on substantive 
aspects of rules in favour of procedural propriety, given that judicial review focuses on 
process as opposed to merits.55 Scholars also suggest that judicial review may also increase 
the cost of rule-making and application due to resource drains associated with following 
procedures and consultations.56 
Similarly, there is a growing body of evidence that suggests that the effect of judicial review 
on government policy is usually temporary and sometimes counterproductive. This evidence 
indicates that sometimes agencies consider judicial review as an unwelcome intrusion into 
their work. Consequently, they do not always comply with the judicial directives.57 It is, 
therefore, common to see agencies refusing to comply with Court directives that they consider 
as unwanted judicial encroachment into their turf. As Wagner observes, “a sizeable body of 
literature suggests that agencies actually are quite bold about explicitly rejecting judicial 
precedent.”58 More subtle forms of non-compliance with judicial dictates have also been 
recorded. There also seems to be evidence of legal risk taking by agencies.  It has thus been 
argued that the cumulative disadvantages of judicial review may well outweigh its advantages 
in advancing the public interest.59 
Commentators have also observed that sometimes judicial review is met with outright 
hostility from public officials. According, to Tatel, environmental officials ordinarily have 
considerable technical expertise in their field and belong to the executive branch which is 
considered politically accountable to the electorate.60 Accordingly, they: 
 “find judicial review an especially bitter pill to swallow when their rules are set aside, 
not because the agency lacked authority to adopt them, but rather because of procedural 
flaws in their promulgation.”61  
These specialist agencies consequently perceive the judges as “obstructionist or even 
activist.”62 
                                                          
54 Ibid, p98. 
55 Wagner, p1770 
56 Wagner, p1768 
57 Wagner p1730 
58 Wagner, p1730. 
59 Wagner, p 1732. 
60 The Hon. David S. Tatel (2010), ‘The Administrative Process and the Rule of Environmental Law,’ Harvard 




Accordingly, the question whether judicial review improves the quality of decision-making in 
the environmental sector is an open question that necessitates more comprehensive empirical 
research.63  
Moreover, it is also apparent that agencies are subjected to other forces of influence and 
pressures apart from judicial review. Consequently, it is not always clear whether agencies act 
in a particular manner because of judicial influence or other influences. As Wagner notes, 
“agencies do not generally treat court reprimands as hard constraints on their authority.”64 It 
would appear that sometimes a public official may find it more attractive to risk the wrath of 
the judiciary “than to anger an influential constituent or to find oneself crosswise with the 
Chief Executive.”65 This, in turn, mitigates the stated benefits of judicial review. The impact 
of judicial review on agency behaviour thus remains generally unclear.  
It is against this backdrop that this study sought to interrogate the significant disconnects 
between dominant understandings of judicial review and the realities of rulemaking, 
application and adjudication.  This study offers the first empirical analysis of judicial review 
and its impact on the operations of environmental agencies since the adoption of the new 
Constitution. The main focus of this study was on whether judicial review has had any impact 
on agency rule-making, rule implementation and adjudication. In this context, the study will 
focus on the following questions:  
(a) How do environmental agencies and other stakeholders respond to judicial review? 
(b)  Are there any unintended effects of judicial review that could ultimately impede the 
ability of environmental agencies to fulfil their statutory mandates?  
(c) If so, what are they? 
(d)  How have the narrow interests represented by litigation between parties translated 
into wider public interests?   
1.5 Methodology 
1.5.1. Study design and methodological approach 
The development of policy and rules ideally follows what public policy scholars have termed 
the ‘policy cycle.’ The term refers to a tool designed by social scientists to analyse how public 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
62 Tatel, p2. 
63Ibid, p98. 
64 Wagner, p1732. 
65 Wagner, p1732. 
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policies are “formulated, put on a legal footing and implemented. “66 The policy cycle model 
is particularly useful in revealing the factors, including legal constraints that influence 
decision making at different stages of the policy-making and implementation process. These 
include administrative law.  Briefly, the policy cycle involves: identification of the problem to 
be solved, proposing a policy, providing legal authority for policy (rule making), applying a 
policy and political and legal challenges to policy implementation (which includes rule 
adjudication) and policy evaluation.   
As an analytical tool, the policy cycle helps policy analysts understand the various stages of 
the rule and policy-making process and the role that the law, including administrative law, 
plays in the policy and rule making, implementation and adjudication process.67  Its utility lies 
in the fact that it reveals how the law plays a dual role of enabling government to pursue its 
policies while at the same time operating as a tool for controlling government power. 68The 
policy cycle model also enables researchers to assess how close the legal system under 
scrutiny is to the ideal. 
The utilization of the policy cycle model as a tool for analyzing how environmental agencies 
formulate, implement and enforce rules is critical to this study given that, hitherto, there has 
been no systematic study to evaluate how environmental policies are formulated, given legal 
force and implemented by environmental agencies. Similarly, there has been no systematic 
study on the impact of the environmental policy making process on administrative law and 
governance in Malawi.  Most existing studies have been rather descriptive and focused on the 
substance of environmental legislation and policy, paying little attention to the process of 
rule-making and implementation.69 This is problematic given that the process of policy 
formulation, implementation and implementation, almost invariably affects the quality of 
environment. 
This study was mainly qualitative in nature. A qualitative study was considered ideal because 
it would enable the researcher to gain an in-depth understanding of how environmental 
agencies operate and how members of the public interact with environmental agencies on a 
daily basis.  Qualitative research offers methods to understand people’s views and 
perspectives in their natural settings thus enables the researcher to investigate the meaning of 
                                                          
66Andrew Le Sueur and Maurice Sunkin (1997), Public Law, (Longman), p4 
67Sunkin (1997) p99 
68Ibid. 
69CEPA, Assessment of Policy Implementation and Legal Compliance in theEnvironment and Natural Resources 
Management Sector (2008), p4. 
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a social phenomenon as experienced by the relevant people themselves.70   It is also the best 
design for an inquiry into experiences of the public and unfolding the meaning of these 
experiences as it about ‘persons’ lives, lived experiences, behaviours, emotions and feelings 
as well as about organisational functioning, social movement...’71   Qualitative research is 
ideal for a project of this nature because environmental governance is highly interdisciplinary. 
Research in environmental governance thus benefits from going beyond textual research of 
primary and secondary legal sources.72   
The study centered on key principles of administrative law making, implementation, 
adjudication. These principles are legality, rationality and procedural propriety. 
An urban-rural dichotomy approach informed the research.  This was necessary because there 
is a clear divide between urban and rural areas as far as environmental governance structures 
are concerned besides other characteristics.  For instance, it is in the urban areas where main 
or headquarters offices for government agencies are situated while rural areas have branch 
offices. The institutional interfaces, coordination, cooperation and impact were an important 
part of the study. Thus the dichotomy ensured that beyond the government agencies 
established to exercise general supervision and co-ordination over all matters relating to the 
environment, many other players and experiences at the lowest level were captured.   It was 
important to capture whether the principles of administrative law are followed at all levels 
from the top to the lowest one i.e. from the headquarters  offices to the district branch offices  
The different levels and types of local government were also separately considered as each 
offers a different level of exercise of power and reflects the urban-rural divide.  There are 
three main types of local government; there are District Councils, which are predominantly in 
the rural while City and Municipal Councils are in the urban areas. The different types of 
local government have differences in terms of their constitution and decision making, 
bureaucracy and structure, population size and public demand of services and types of 
services, level of awareness by the public and access to courts.  Hence the local governments’ 
structures such as the city, the municipal and the district were all considered as part of the 
research. 
                                                          
70 Salvin-Baden M & Major CH Qualitative Research: The Essential Guide to Theory and Practice 2013 11 
71 Strauss A & Corbin J Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing 
grounded theory (1998) 11 
72 Owen D & Noblet C ‘Interdisciplinary Research and Environmental Law’ (2015) 41:4 Ecological Law 
Quarterly 887, at  890  
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1.5.2. Sites for the study 
The study sites were chosen purposively, bearing in mind the urban-rural dichotomy, the 
different types of local government authorities, cost effectiveness and socio-cultural and 
demographic characteristics of the populations.  The research sites were selected in all three 
geographical regions of Malawi (Southern, Central and Northern regions).  
The Southern region sites that were selected were Blantyre and Mulanje. Blantyre was 
selected because it is the commercial capital and represents an urban area in the Southern 
Region. Blantyre is the main industrial city in Malawi and hence it experiences multiple 
environmental governance challenges. Blantyre is also the seat of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and the Principal Registry of the High Court. Mulanje district was selected because it 
is a populous rural and boarder district that is characterised by commercial farming. Mulanje 
district has highest mountain in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This mountain is a biological 
hotspot with approximately 500 globally unique and threatened plants and animal species. 
Recently, the District has been embroiled in disputes between local communities and mining 
companies over mining exploration activities that have been taking place on the Mountain and 
surrounding areas. The district is also embroiled in controversies surrounding the 
conservation of the mountain and the way eco-tourism licences are granted.  It was felt that 
interrogating these issues has provided rich data on decision making and participation at the 
lowest level.  Additionally, this study focused on Mwanza district, another environmental 
hotspot, which was recently involved in environment-related controversies between 
communities and a railway line construction company. 
Two sites were selected in the Central Region, namely Lilongwe and Ntchisi. Lilongwe was 
selected because it is the capital city and hence the seat of most central government 
departments including the Department of Environmental Affairs.  Ntchisi district represents 
rural areas that are governed by District Councils. Lilongwe City Council was considered 
ideal for this study because environmental rule making, implementation and adjudication at 
city level falls under the jurisdiction of the City Council. Thus, it presents a good opportunity 
to study the interface between Central and Local Government. This is particularly important 
given that the jurisdictions of the Central and Local Government tends to overlap in large 
urban places like Lilongwe. 
In the Northern Region, the study focused on Mzuzu City and Karonga district.  Mzuzu City 
was chosen owing to its status as an economic hub of the Region. The growth of the city has 
brought with it attendant environmental governance problems which are worthy studying.  
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Karonga District is rural district at the northern tip of Malawi which was chosen on the 
premise that it is a rural district which is rapidly transforming into an urban town.  It is an 
environmental hotspot in that it hosts Malawi’s first Uranium Mine and also has a coal mine.  
Karonga was also chosen because of its long distance from Lilongwe. This was because this 
study assumed that the distance from the Headquarters would have a bearing on how public 
authorised exercised their discretion. These characteristics made the district a worthwhile 
potential study site.  
1.5.3. Sample Design and Sampling Procedure 
 
At the outset, the researchers endeavoured to draw an appropriate survey sample representing 
the population which is involved in agenda setting, rule-making, rule implementation and rule 
adjudication. Ordinary citizens who interact with administrative agencies and local authorities 
on a daily basis were also identified and included in the study. A multistage strategy of 
sampling was adopted to ensure inclusion of diverse sections of society. Guidelines were 
agreed on by team members on how to identify potential respondents that reflect the key 
informants at every level of decision-making, including representatives of those who are 
affected by decisions. The following guidelines below informed the sampling process.  
 
For triangulation purposes for triangulation purposes five tiers of potential respondents were 
identified. These are:  
1. Rule  makers and actors  
2. Street- level bureaucrats (implementers) 
3. People affected by decisions of the above officials (e.g consumers or direct users of 
their services) 
4. Rule  adjudicators 
5. Other stakeholders and relevant NGOs, including community leaders. 
 
The key informants that were identified in this study represented the broad categories of rule 
makers, implementers and adjudicators. The list of those targeted included the Principal 
Secretary for Environmental Affairs, Director of Environmental Affairs, Environmental 
Inspectors, Director of Forestry Judges of the High Court and those responsible for 
environmental management at Local Authority level.  The list also included frontline or 
implementation-level workers- (those who make decisions that are subject to challenge i.e. 
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environmental inspectors, district environmental officers). In order to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the actual operations of environmental agencies, this study mainly targeted 
those who make daily operational decisions as opposed to those who are charged with the 
overall responsibility of managing government Ministries, such as Principal Secretaries. 
Representatives of other stakeholders, including academic institutions and nongovernmental 
organizations were also targeted. These included members of the academia, civil society 
organizations and community leaders.  The list of persons that are usually affected by the 
decisions of environmental agencies included consumers or direct users of the services of 
environmental agencies. Applicants for planning permission, permits and licences fall under 
this category.  
 
This study paid attention to the practical interface and interaction between gender and 
environmental governance during the interviews.  In order to achieve this it was decided that 
women who interact with environmental and natural resource managers be deliberately 
targeted. This would present an opportunity to interrogate the gender dynamics of 
environmental governance. 
 
1.5.4 Data Collection tools 
The data collected in this study came from two main sources. The primary sources of the data 
presented herein include key informant interviews, in-depth interviews, focus group 
discussions and observations. The study also relied on secondary sources of data including 
reports, case law, newspaper articles and other publications.  
2. COUNTRY CONTEXT AND HISTORY 
2.1 Country profile 
Malawi is a small country in South-East Africa that is characterised by poor socio-economic 
indicators. Malawi covers a total area of 118,484 km2, 20% of which is covered by water, 
mainly Lake Malawi. According to the 2008 Population and Housing Census Report, the 
population of Malawi in that year was 13, 077, 160 people representing a population density 
of 139 people per square kilometre. For 2016, the projected population is at 17, 663 620 with 
a growth rate of 3.24%73. Thus, Malawi is one of the most densely populated countries in 
continental Africa and this causes a lot of pressure on its limited environmental/land 
resources. 
                                                          
73 National Statistics Office Website, 2016 
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The country is divided into three regions: the Northern, Central, and Southern Regions. There 
are 28 districts in the country. Six districts are in the Northern Region, nine are in the Central 
Region, and 13 are in the Southern Region. Administratively, the districts are subdivided into 
traditional authorities (TAs), presided over by chiefs. Each TA is composed of villages, which 
are the smallest administrative units, and the villages are presided over by village headmen. 
The 2010 State of Environment and Outlook Report by Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Energy and Environment outlines the key environmental problems facing Malawi. These 
include soil erosion, deforestation, pollution, water resources depletion and degradation, high 
population growth, depletion of fish stocks, threats to biodiversity, human habitat degradation, 
poor waste management, and climate change and air pollution. Similar problems were 
identified in the 2004 National Environmental Policy and the National Environmental Action 
Plan (NEAP) 1994. Malawi’s high population density and its over-dependence on agriculture 
are highlighted as substantial causes of continued environmental degradation. The problems 
are aggravated by poverty since a significant proportion of the population relies on the 
exploitation of natural resources for survival74. The State of the Environment Report also cites 
poor environmental governance as one of the major drivers of environmental degradation.75 
 
Malawi is one of the world’s poorest countries. Out of 185 countries on the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) in 2015, she was 
ranked 173.Over 90% of the value of Malawi’s exports is accounted for by natural resource 
sectors most of which originates from agriculture76.  Malawi’s economy is therefore very 
much linked to its environment and environmental degradation threatens its social and 
economic development. The need for sustainable use of its environmental resources and good 
environmental governance cannot be over-emphasised.  
2.2. Country Environmental History  
Prior to the advent of colonialism, communities used various local conservation practices to 
sustain their production systems.77  At this time, communities were governed by chiefs whose 
                                                          
74 The Malawi State of the Environment and Outlook Report (SOEOR), 2010 
75 SOEOR,p254. 
76Commission of the European Communities, ‘Country Environmental Profile for Malawi’, 2006 
77 Oliver W Mulwafu, Conservation Song: A History of Peasant-State Relations and the Environment in Malawi; 
1860-2000 (Cambridge: The White Horse Press, 2011) 235. 
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authority was often antithetical to democratic processes.78 Public participation in 
environmental matters was almost non-existent. 
Malawi (previously known as Nyasaland) became a British protectorate in 1891. During the 
colonial era, the main law making authority was the British crown. Colonial legislators were 
appointed by and served at pleasure of the crown. They were entirely from the white settler 
community such that they made laws as representatives of the British crown.79Invariably, 
their law making could only reflect and fulfil the wishes of the crown as opposed to the 
natives. Natives were not allowed to be members of the legislative council until the 1949 
when two natives appointed by the colonial authorities were admitted into the Council.80 But 
even then these had no real influence in the Council.81 It can therefore be said that there was 
no direct participation by local communities in law making prior to the 1940s and very 
minimal even ineffective participation/representation in the period immediately after. Such 
absence of representation alienated people from their resources but it also removed the 
essential linkage between policy making and its implementation.82  
 
Colonial rule application was generally characterised by the implementation of British ideas 
about the environment. The draconian colonial regime by its nature was not representative of 
the interests of local people. The only material interests in the colonial era were those of the 
crown. The colonial government had no regard for the views of the natives who were 
considered primitive and retrogressive. Africans were viewed as irrational actors who could 
not be entrusted with environmental management and whose ways required modification to 
suit the ‘sophisticated’ British view.83 In order to operationalize their perceptions of 
environmental conservation, the colonial government believed in using laws and 
accompanying penal sanctions to drive policy in many issues including the environmental 
protection. They also wished to control resources. 84 Consequently, they promulgated 
                                                          
78Gracian Z. Banda, ‘Representing Constituents, Servicing Nature: The Role of An MP in Environment & 
Natural Resources Management in Malawi’ (2006) CEPA, Blantyre 11 
 
79Gracian Banda (n 94) 11 
80E. Kanyongolo, PHD Thesis extract 
81Gracian Banda ( 94) 11 
82Gracian Banda ( 94) 13 
83Ibid, 236 
84 Ibid, 235 
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stringent environmental regulations and accompanying penal sanctions targeting natives.85 
Colonial policy entrenched the view that natural resources were government property 
particularly where natives had to be displaced to conserve resources.86 
Between 1933 and 1963 the colonial administration enacted a number of environmentally 
relevant pieces of legislation. Of particular note were the Natural Resources Ordinances of 
1946 and 1949, and the Land Use and Protection Ordinance of 1962.These laws aimed to 
ensure effective utilisation and management as well as conservation of soil, water and forestry 
resources to curb what the colonial administration referred to as ‘an impending environmental 
disaster.’87The implementation of measures to solve environmental problems appears to have 
been selective and designed to serve the privileged race. The enforcement of environmental 
law generally favoured white people and was particularly harsh on the natives. Enforcement 
was generally coercive and prosecutorial.88 This era thus seems to have been characterised by 
non-consultation or very minimal involvement of the public generally and local communities 
in particular. 
Malawi attained its independence in 1964. This coincided with the emergence of the 
autocratic one party system of government led by Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda. The autocracy, 
which endured for almost thirty years, was characterised by limited public participation in 
rule-making, implementation and adjudication.89 The one party government’s major 
preoccupation was consolidation of political power.  Accordingly, it gave little room for 
consultation or participation by the masses in many areas of governance, including the 
environment. The government thus controlled the making and implementation of policies and 
laws to achieve its political interests. 
However, to some extent compliance with policies and regulations was good given the 
autocratic political environment. On some environmental issues including forestry, the post-
independence government did not want to lose the gains already made by the colonial 
masters. Consequently, it continued with centralised policies of management adopted wholly 
                                                          
85Justin M Kalima, ‘The Effectiveness of Environmental Law in Malawi: An Analysis of the Principal Legal 
Tools for Achieving Environmental Protection with Emphasis on the Criminal Sanction’ (2006) PHD Thesis 
Kwazulu Natal University, p25. 
86Gracian Banda,p 13 
87Gracian Banda,p 14 
88Kalima, p 25, Mulwafu, p 236 
89 Henry G. Chingaipe and Chimwemwe Msukwa (2012), Whose Voice?: Citizen Participation and Influence in 
Public Policy Processes in Malawi, Malawi Economic Justice Network, p1.  
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from the colonial period.90Nevertheless, it made it clear that it would not enforce 
environmental conservation measures which were a colonial burden.91  
Commentators have observed that prior to the advent of political pluralism, citizen 
participation in policy processes “was an empty ritual.”92 Policy formulation was highly 
centralized and fell squarely within the realm of a powerful executive.  All rule-making 
processes were initiated by government, whose decisions prevailed.93 Environmental rule-
making in Malawi thus seems to have transitioned from a point of no 
representation/participation by natives (pre-1960) to indirect, albeit ineffective participation 
through elected partisan local representatives (1960-1994).  
 
Prior to 1994, there were more than 40 environment-related laws.94 A major weakness of the 
pre-1994 environmental management regime was that it was sector specific and responsive to 
environmental issues in an adhoc manner.95 It was characterised by the absence of a general 
environmental law to establish national environmental principles and “provide guidance and 
coherence” to environmental management.96 There was no legal framework to deal with 
cross-sectoral issues.971990s could be described as the ‘watershed’ decade for modern 
environmental law in Malawi. This is because it witnessed more focused legislative and 
policy reforms relating to the environment than the preceding decades. One of the major 
catalysts for these reforms was the upsurge of global interest in the deteriorating state of the 
environment, which characterised the early 1990s. Global concern about the environment led 
to the adoption of the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development as well as 
Agenda 21 and Programme of Action at the 1992 United Nations Conference on the 
Environment and Development (“Earth Summit”).98 Sustainable development, a concept that 
                                                          
90Kamoto, p 
91Zibelu , p 13 
92 Henry Chingaipe and Chimwemwe Msukwa (2014), Whose Voice? : Citizen Participation and Influence in 
Public Policy Processes in Malawi (Malawi Economic Justice Network),p1 
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Environment and Natural Resources Management in Malawi, (CEPA),p6 
94Malawi National Environmental Action Plan 1994, http://www.sdnp.org.mw/. 
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(See Michael Kidd (1997), Environmental Law in South Africa (Juta and Co. Ltd),  
96 Ibid. 
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98Kalima, p  
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gained momentum following the “Earth Summit” was the ideology that informed the radical 
policy and legal reforms that occurred in Malawi between 1994 and 1999.99  
Domestic level developments also triggered legislative and policy reforms. The realisation 
that Malawi was being overtaken by environmental degradation prompted calls for action 
from various stakeholders. The1992-1994 period was also characterised by Malawi’s political 
transition from a one party State to a multi-party democracy and the adoption of a democratic 
Constitution in 1994. Section 13 of the Constitution requires the state, actively, to promote the 
welfare and development of the people of Malawi by progressively adopting and 
implementing policies and legislation aimed at responsible environmental management. 
Specifically, the State is required to adopt and implement policies and laws aimed at 
preventing environmental degradation, providing a healthy living and working environment 
for the people of Malawi, according full recognition to intergenerational equity and 
sustainable development, and conserving, as well as enhancing Ma lawi’s biological 
diversity.100 The 1994 Constitution embraces the ethos of public participation and contains a 
number of provisions that support public participation in all aspects of governance.101 This 
signalled a new direction for legislative and policy reforms. 
Pursuant to the above commitments and with strong encouragement from development 
partners the government of Malawi formulated a National Environmental Action Plan 
(NEAP) in 1994, followed by a National Environmental Policy in 1996. This policy laid the 
foundation for the development of the Environment Management Act (EMA), 1996 and 
further legislative action targeting various natural resource sectors.102 The EMA was the first 
piece of legislation to attempt to address issues of the environment in an integrated manner, a 
departure from existing legislation which was sectoral in nature.  
The advent of multiparty democracy ushered in opportunities for openness and public 
participation in rule-making, implementation and adjudication processes.103 As Chingaipe and 
Msukwa suggest, the political reforms of 1994 heralded a new era characterised by what 
                                                          
99 Dobson , p 160 
100 Section 13(d) 
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Chingaipe and Msukwa call “genuine participation in policy processes.”104 The transition to 
multiparty democracy also changed the world-view of many Malawians who increasingly 
came to the realization that they could impact on the way they are governed. This was in 
contrast to the colonial and one-party eras where, as Dobson observes, “life seemed to unfold 
as an unchangeable matter of fate.”105 These observations seems to be corroborated by 
existing literature which suggest that environmental and natural resources laws are generally 
adopted using a participatory approach characterised by wide stakeholder consultation.106  
Makawa, a former Legal Officer for the EAD, for instance, has observed that “there has been 
a deliberate shift in legal and policy instruments to enhance the role of citizens at different 
levels” in rule making.107  He notes that environmental policy and rule-making in Malawi 
involves the consultation of a wide range of stakeholders, including traditional and other local 
leaders, religious leaders and agricultural extension workers. This paper, however, considers 
the nature and quality of that participation.  
2.3 The legal and normative framework for environmental management in Malawi 
2.3.1. Constitutional principles underlying environmental management 
The Constitution is the supreme law of Malawi. It defines the basic framework for 
government and defines the operations of its branches. Of particular importance for 
environmental rule-making, application and adjudication is section 5 which enshrines the 
principle of constitutional supremacy. The section provides that “any act of Government or 
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution shall, to the extent of such 
inconsistency, be invalid.” This provision impacts on environmental governance insofar as it 
subjects all rule-making, application and adjudication functions of environmental agencies to 
the test of constitutionality. Courts have a duty to ensure that public agencies exercise their 
functions in accordance with the Constitution. Section 108(2) gives the High Court original 
jurisdiction to review “any law, and any action or decision of the Government, for conformity 
with” the Constitution.  
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The most important milestone in the history of Malawi’s environmental law has arguably 
been the incorporation of an environmental management provision in section 13 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994. Section 13(d) provides a constitutional basis 
for environmental rulemaking and rule application in Malawi. The section requires the 
government progressively to adopt and implement laws and policies aimed at managing the 
environment responsibly. The principles of national policy according to section 14 of the 
Constitution are merely directory in nature. However, courts are entitled to take them into 
consideration when “interpreting and applying any of the provisions of the Constitution or of 
any law or in determining the validity of decisions of the executive and in the interpretation of 
the provisions of the Constitution.”108  
Although it is generally believed that the principles of national policy cannot be equated to 
constitutional rights,109 there have been judicial pronouncements which suggest to the 
contrary. One such pronouncement was made in the Phillipine case of Oposa et al v 
Fulgencio S Factoran, Jr.et al.110 In this case the Supreme Court of the Philippines was asked 
to determine the status of ‘the right to a balanced and healthful ecology’ which is contained in 
the ‘Declaration of Principles and State Policies’ part of the Constitution. The Court observed 
that the inclusion of the right in the Declaration of Principles section, as opposed to the Bill of 
Rights, did not make it any “less important than any of the civil and political rights 
enumerated in the latter.”111        
Apart from explicitly including the environment in the principles of national policy the 
Constitution also contains a Bill of Rights which enshrines human rights that are pertinent to 
environmental management. These include the right to life, the right to property and the right 
to development. The Bill of Rights also provides for access to information and access to 
justice.  
The Bill of Rights contains a provision which is particularly relevant to environmental 
governance, namely the administrative justice clause. Section 43 of the Constitution provides 
that every person shall have the right to— 
 
                                                          
108Section 14; Justice Chimasula, the Administrator of the Esatate of Dr Kamuzu Banda v the Attorney General, 
HC Civil Cause No. 1839 (A) of 1997, p17 of the transcript.  
109 Justin Kalima (2011) 
110 G.R. No.101083. 
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(a) lawful and procedurally fair administrative action, which is justifiable in 
relation to reasons given where his or her rights, freedoms, legitimate 
expectations or interests are affected or threatened; and 
(b) be furnished with reasons, in writing, for administrative action where his or her 
rights, freedoms, legitimate expectations or interests are affected. 
There have been some judicial pronouncements to the effect that section 43 merely restates 
the common law principles of natural justice.112 However, these decisions have been criticised 
by some commentators. Chirwa, for instance, contends that the Constitution “provides for 
new and expansive grounds for review than was the case under the common law.”113 He notes 
that the notion of lawfulness under section 43 is wider than the notion of legality under the 
common law. This, according to him is because, in determining whether a public officer acted 
lawfully, the Court will not merely consider whether he or she acted intra-vires. It may also 
consider whether the officer complied with the Constitution. Procedural fairness is broader 
than the compliance with rules of natural justice and reflects the general duty to act fairly. 114 
Furthermore, the Constitutional right to reasons, in writing, for decisions that affect an 
individual’s rights, interests and legitimate expectations is not available at common law. 115 
Chirwa also correctly opines that section 43 provides for justification as a ground for review. 
He observes that the requirement that administrative action should be justifiable in relation to 
reasons given is much broader than the ground of rationality under the common law.116   
 
Chirwa’s observations find support in minority judicial opinion. In the High Court case of The 
State v Blantyre City Assembly, ex.p. Ngwala117  Justice Mwaungulu opined that the 
statements made by some Judges that section 43 merely repeats the principles of natural 
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justice were “not very accurate conceptually.”118  Mwaungulu’s opinion finds support in 
South African jurisprudence. In the case of Van Huyssteen & Others v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs & Tourism & Others,119 for example, the High Court of South Africa 
disagreed with the contention that section 24(b) of the South   African Constitution (a 
provision identical to section 43) merely codified the common law principles of natural 
justice. Justice Farmlam observed as follows:  
 
“I do not think that one can regard section 24(b) as codifying the existing law and thus 
read down, as it were the wide language of the paragraph, unless the existing law was 
already so wide and flexible that it was covered by the concept of procedural 
fairness.”120  
 
Academic commentators have also supported the argument that the administrative justice 
clause does not merely reinstate common law rules. Rather it affords the courts a chance to 
consider the “merits of a decision by developing a theory of what is desirable.”121 In this 
context, DeVille argues that section 24 of the South African Constitution, which is identical to 
its counterpart in Section 43 of the Malawi Constitution, introduces the continental notion of 
proportionality into administrative law.122  Justifiability, according to him, demands that 
administrative action to be “.....suitable and necessary to attain the statutory prescribed 
purpose and which does not result in harm to individual(s) which is out of proportion to the 
gains to the community.”123 Justifiability cannot just be equated to rationality. 
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The foregoing position finds support in judicial opinion from South Africa. In the South 
African case of Roman v Williams124 , Justice Van Deventer cited with approval DeVille’s 
writings. He observed as follows:  
 
“I find myself fully in agreement with the learned author that the constitutional test 
imports the requirement of proportionality between means and end and that the role of 
the courts in judicial reviews is no longer limited to the way in which an administrative 
decision was reached but now extends to its substance and merits.”125  
 
He further observed that 
 
 “judicial review no longer has an independent existence apart from constitutional 
review, which casts the net much wider and renders the common law irrelevant in this 
case, as I said earlier. In my view the constitutional test of legality clearly overrides the 
common law review grounds.” 
 
Accordingly he rightly concluded that:  
 
“Like the test of reasonableness, the new constitutional test of justifiability ‘in relation 
to the reasons given for the decision’ must obviously be an objective one. 
Administrative action in order to qualify as justifiable in relation to the reasons given 
must meet the three requirements of suitability, necessity and proportionality.”126 
 
The incorporation of Section 43 into the Malawi Constitution has profound implications for 
administrative law generally and environmental rule-making, rule application and rule 
adjudication. This is especially so because the section reflects a rights-based approach to 
administrative justice. Under the common-law, the onus of proving whether a public officer 
has breached his legal duty is on the claimant. However, the rights-based approach imposes 
the onus of justifying why a citizen’s right to administrative justice should be limited on the 
public officer.  Accordingly, it provides a basis for challenging the manner in which 
environmental agencies make rules, apply rules and adjudicate upon matters related to 
                                                          





environmental management. Section 43 thus heralds the introduction of a rights-based 
approach to judicial review and renders administrative decisions of environmental agencies 
amenable to judicial review under the Constitution.  
 
Another important provision of the Constitution that is relevant to environmental governance 
is section 15 (2). This provision, as observed below, virtually liberalises the locus standi 
requirement and potentially paves way for more public participation in environmental 
adjudication processes.  
 
The inclusion of the above provisions in our Constitution makes it imperative for 
administrative law scholars to endeavour to understand the effect of the constitutional order 
on administrative law and the extent to which the above provisions impact on the work of 
environmental agencies. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of literature in this regard. This paper 
thus attempts to shed some light on this issue. 
2.3.2  Framework Legislation 
Like many other countries, Malawi reformed its environmental policies and laws following 
the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development. The policy and 
law reform process commenced in 1994 with the development of the National Environmental 
Action Plan. It culminated in the development of the National Environmental Policy and the 
Environment Management Act (EMA) in 1996.  From an environmental governance 
perspective, the enactment of the EMA served a number of key objectives, including the 
improvement of cross-sectoral coordination in environmental management.127  
 
The EMA 1996 will soon be superseded by the recently enacted Environment Management 
Act 2016 (EMA, 2016). Upon coming into force, the EMA, 2016, will repeal the EMA 1996. 
The new law purports to provide for a more responsive legal framework for the protection and 
management of the environment, as well as the conservation and sustainable utilisation of 
natural resources. 
2.3.3 Sectoral legislation 
 
                                                          
127 Gracian Zibelu Banda (2004), Revision of the Environment Management Act – Draft Report, Environmental 
Affairs Department, p2. 
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One defining characteristic of Malawi’s environmental law is its diffuse nature. 
Environmental law is provided for in a wide range of Acts of Parliament and subsidiary 
legislation. No single legal instrument comprehensively makes provision for environmental 
rule-making, application and adjudication in Malawi. While the Environment Management 
Act, 1996 attempts to provide for a comprehensive legal framework for environmental 
management in Malawi, it falls short of regulating all aspects of the environment.  
Consequently, the government has developed sector specific legislation to regulate 
environmental and natural resource management in various sectors. For instance, the Forestry 
sector is regulated by the Forestry Act is responsible for the management of Forests. The 
Fisheries sector is regulated by the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, 1997, the 
Fisheries Management Regulations, 2000 and the Local Community Participation Rules, 
2000. The Wildlife Sector is regulated by the National Parks and Wildlife Act. The Water 
sector is governed by the Water Resources Act, Water-Works Act and Public Health Act. The 
Government has also devolved some environmental management functions to local level 
institutions under the Local Government Act, 1998. 
 
However, the EMA still remains the overarching statute on environmental management. All 
the sectoral laws are subordinate to it. Section 7 of the EMA renders any written law on the 
protection and management of the environment that is inconsistent with any of its provisions 
invalid to the extent of such inconsistency. For that reason the EMA is generally considered 
as the environmental constitution in Malawi. 
 
In order to ensure that environmental management functions are well coordinated, the EMA 
contains a number of provisions aimed at ensuring coordinated environmental management. 
Section 10 of the EMA establishes the National Council for the Environment which comprises 
Principal Secretaries from all government ministries. The primary role of the Council is to 
advise the Minister on all matters affecting the Environment.128 Among the responsibilities of 
the Council is recommending “measures necessary for the harmonization of activities, plans 
and policies of lead agencies and non-governmental organizations.”129 The EMA also 
establishes the Technical Committee on the Environment, whose primary role is to advise the 
                                                          
128 Section 12 of the EMA. 
129 Section 12(c) of the EMA  
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Minister, Council, Director and any lead agency on technical issues relating to the 
environment.130 
 
3. RULE MAKING 
3.1 Actors 
Part III of the EMA outlines the institutional framework for environmental 
management in Malawi.  Section 8(1) of the EMA places the Minister at the helm of 
environmental management. The section recognizes the Minister as the main duty-bearer for 
environmental protection and management in Malawi. The section explicitly requires the 
Minister to take necessary measures for achieving the objectives of the EMA in consultation 
with lead agencies. Section 9 of the EMA establishes the office of Director of Environmental 
Affairs. The Director’s Office is responsible for coordination of environmental management 
in Malawi. The Director heads the Department of Environmental Affairs and is responsible to 
the Minister for the proper discharge of environmental management functions.131  
 
The diffuse nature of environmental law in Malawi means that there is no agency that is 
solely responsible for environmental rule-making in Malawi. Apart from the Department of 
Environmental Affairs, there are not less than 15 lead agencies responsible for rule-making in 
the environmental arena.132  The key players in this sector are government departments 
including Forestry, National Parks and Wildlife, Fisheries, Lands and Water. Environmental 
management functions at local authority level fall under the mandate of Councils. The Local 
Government Act, 1998 gives Council power to make by-laws. 
 
The multiplicity of rule-making agencies in the environmental sector gives almost invariably 
gives rise to uncertainties and overlapping rulemaking functions. This creates the potential for 
rule incoherence, overlaps and contradictions.133 For example, section 30 of the EMA 
authorizes the Minister responsible for environmental affairs to “prescribe environmental 
quality standards generally, and in particular, for water, effluent etc.”  Section 91 of the Water 
Resources Act, gives the Minister responsible for water power to prescribe “standards for 
                                                          
130 Sections 16 and 17 of the EMA. 
131 Section 9(2)(b). 
132 These Lead Agencies administer and enforce environmental laws relating to water, air, land, fisheries, 
forestry, national parks and wildlife, pollution and waste management, and public health. 
133 In fact, the National Environmental Policy, 2004, indicates that sectoral environmental laws and policies are 
characterised by “gaps, conflicts and duplications which adversely affect” their effective implementation. (p.iii). 
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effluent quality.” 134 This, as some commentators have observed, has the potential to generate 
conflicts of jurisdiction and “confusion of roles among actors.”135 
3.2 Roles 
The task of developing environmental laws and policies remains within the realm of central 
government agencies, including Cabinet and Parliament. However, most environment-related 
statutes contain provisions that delegate policymaking and rulemaking powers to certain 
public officials.  136  
Section 8 of the EMA confers on the Minister the power to formulate environmental 
management policies. The Minister is also charged with the task of recommending to 
government environmental Treaties to which Malawi should be a party.137  Specifically, the 
Minister has regulation-making powers on different subjects. These include environmental 
impact assessments (EIAs), 138environmental quality criteria and standards, 139access to 
genetic resources,140protection of the ozone layer,141 waste management, 142management of 
pesticides/hazardous substances,143recommendation of fiscal incentives and general 
environmental management.144 The Acts stipulates that the functions of the Minister in this 
regard are supposed to be exercised in consultation with lead agencies and the National 
Council.  In formulating policies, legislation, regulations, criteria, standards and guidelines 
the Minister acts on the advice of the National Council and the Technical Committee on the 
Environment.145 The Council is also charged with the responsibility of recommending to the 
Minister measures necessary for the integration of environmental considerations in economic 
planning and development. These measures invariably include policies and rules. 
 
                                                          
134 Section 85 of the Water Resources Act , for example, authorises empowers the Water Resources Authority to 
declare certain areas to be protected areas. This is where doing so may be necessary to protect catchment areas 
from deforestation. The Minister of Environmental Affairs has similar powers under section 32 of the EMA. 
135 O’neill et al, p21. 
136 Section 51(1) of the EMA gives the Director power to “prescribe the activities in respect of which records 
shall be kept.”    
137 Section 8(2)(i) 
138 Section 24. 
139 Section 8(2)(l) 
140 Section 36(1) 
141 Section 41 
142 Section 37 
143 Section 40 
144 Section 77. 
145 Section 12 and 17 of the EMA. 
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The prescribed forum for notifying the public about the promulgation of the above rules is the 
Gazette. This raises questions relating to access to these rules by the general public which 
does not have access to the Gazette. 
 
According to Kidd, legislative functions include “the responsibility of public officials to 
activate control provisions in legislation.”146 These responsibilities include declaration of 
protected areas. For example, Section 32 of the EMA empowers the Minister to declare 
environmental protection areas.  The section also obliges the Director to set out policies for 
environmental management in protection plans for environmental protection areas.147The 
EMA also empowers the Director to issue environmental protection orders.148 
Sectoral environmental laws also confer quasi-legislative or rule-making authority on Lead 
Agencies.  Examples of these laws abound.149 While the Environmental Affairs Department 
(EAD) is primarily responsible for cross-sectoral coordination of environmental management, 
sectoral agencies are responsible for sector level, rule-making.  
The government of Malawi pursuant to the Decentralization Policy has developed policies 
and legal instruments that purport to create an enabling environment for devolved 
environmental management. Environmental rule-making activities at local authority level are 
primarily guided by the Local Government Act, 1998. Section 4 of the Local Government 
Act, 1994 and the Second Schedule thereof, authorizes Municipal and City Councils to 
perform certain rule-making functions pertaining to environmental management.150 Similarly, 
section 103 of the Local Government Act gives wide powers to Councils “to make by-
laws......for the prevention and suppression of nuisances therein and for any other purpose.”  
 
                                                          
146 Kidd, p 19. 
147  Section 32(3)(a). 
148 Section 33. 
149 Section 40 of the Forestry Act gives, for instance, empowers the Director power to “declare any forestry area 
to be a fire protection area” and to “regulate the lighting of fires in such area.” The Act also gives the Director 
the responsibility of establishing rules for village forest areas [section 5(e)]. Section 91 of the Water Resources 
Act empowers the Minister responsible for water resources to prescribe effluent quality standards. 
150 Section 2(1) of the Second Schedule authorizes Councils to establish services for the collection and removal 
of solid and liquid waste. It also authorizes them to regulate various aspects of sanitation and waste management. 
Section 2 of the Second Schedule, empowers the Council to “prohibit or control any noxious or offensive trade 
within the meaning of the Public Health Act and the use of premises which may be a source of nuisance, danger, 
discomfort or annoyance to the neighbourhood.” The schedule also empowers Councils to make rules for the 
control of nuisances [section 4], control of hazardous materials [section 6], prohibition and control of water 
pollution [section 2(6)]   
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Sectoral laws also delegate some environmental rule-making functions to local government 
agencies and communities.151 City, Municipal and District Councils have pursuant to these 
laws also been mandated to formulate and implement environmental rules as well as 
adjudicate upon environmental disputes at local authority level. The government has also 
established environmental offices at district level. These offices are managed by District 
Environmental Officers provided for under Section 20 of the Act. Pursuant to the 
decentralization policy Local Authorities are also empowered to make rules relating to 
environmental management. The EMA, for instance, authorizes the Minister to recommend to 
Minister responsible for Local Government the promulgation of waste management rules for 
local authorities. 152  
In terms of legality of rule-making, this study found evidence of compliance with the law at 
all levels. Respondents were able to point at source of authority for their rulemaking powers. 
It was clear from the study that Councillors, Directors and DCs routinely consult laws prior to 
promulgating rules. 
However, this study has found that despite the existence of the above institutional framework 
a number of problems still persist in terms of rule-making.  
 First, notwithstanding the enactment of the EMA and the establishment of the above 
institutional framework, environmental rulemaking still appears fragmented. It is still 
characterised by a multiplicity of institutions and actors with overlapping and conflicting 
mandates. Cross-sectoral coordination of rulemaking still appears weak. Of course, it is the 
responsibility of the National Council for the Environment (NCE) to recommend measures 
that are necessary for the harmonization of policies of lead agencies. However, there is 
evidence from this study suggests that the effectiveness of the NCE has failed to perform this 
role in practice. This is for a number of reasons. First, while section 10 of the EMA envisages 
that representation on NCE comprises high level officers from lead agencies (Principal 
Secretaries, in practice such officers rarely attend NCE meetings. NCE meetings are usually 
attended by lower level representatives who do not have the requisite clout to influence 
environmental rulemaking. This undermines the quality of coordination relating to 
rulemaking. 
                                                          
151 The Forestry Act empowers Village Natural Resource Management Committees (VNRMCs) to make by-
laws. Section 33 subject any rules made by VNRMCs to the approval of the Minister. 
152 Section 37(2) 
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The EMA, 2016, has recognized this problem and has provided for the establishment of a 
National Environment Protection Authority, which will be the principal agency for 
environmental management in Malawi.153 The new law also contains provisions aimed at 
strengthening environmental coordination in Malawi. These include section 9 which 
empowers the authority to coordinate, monitor and supervise all activities of stakeholders 
relating to utilisation and management of the environment. The authority is also empowered 
to direct other agencies to perform their environmental management functions and impose 
sanctions in the event of default.154The EMA, 2016, also imposes reporting obligations on 
lead agencies. Section 24 of the Act requires Lead Agencies to submit annual reports to the 
authority with respect to the segment of the environment they are charged with. 
Second, between 2004 and 2014 the Government of Malawi did not hold local government 
elections. This had implications for the legality of rules that local authorities made during this 
period.155 The absence of Councillors meant that there were no vibrant Councils and 
environmental rulemaking entities at local authority level. This forced Courts to develop the 
principle of ‘necessary legality’ in order to address the absurdities and adverse consequences 
of this legal vacuum. The case of Zomba Municipal Assembly v the University of 
Malawi,156illustrates how the High Court was more than keen to condone illegal rule-making 
of the Municipality of Zomba in order to ensure that the Municipality of Zomba collected 
rates to support service delivery. The Court was requested to determine whether Zomba 
Municipal Assembly had the legal mandate to revise rates in the absence of elected 
Councillors. The Court conceded that, legally, the power to the Local Government Act (LGA) 
conferred the power to levy taxes on Assemblies and that this power was not delegable. 
However, the Court noted that the law was silent on what is supposed to happen in the 
absence of the Assembly.  Accordingly, it proceeded to decide that Zomba Municipal 
Assembly was legally entitled to levy taxes. The Court based its ruling on necessity. It noted 
that Local Assemblies had a constitutional and statutory duty to provide essential services to 
their residents. This duty, according to the Court, subsisted irrespective of whether there was 
an assembly or not. Consequently, “any interpretation of the LGA that would result in the 
invalidating of constitutional duty imposed on the assembly to levy taxes was invalid and 
                                                          
153 Section 7. 
154 Section 22. 
155 Michael Chasukwa,Asiyati Chiweza and Tiyesere Chikapa (2014), Public Participation in Local Councils in 
Malawi in the Absence of Local Elected Representatives-Political Eliticism or Pluralism, Journal of Asian and 
African Studies, vol. 49 no. 6, 705-720 
156 High Court Civil Cause Number 3567 of 2006. 
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must be avoided.”157 However, the notion of “necessary legality” was rejected by Justice 
Chikopa in GH Bandawe (trading as Kaka Motel) v Mzuzu City Assembly.158 In that case the 
Judge stressed the needs for Assemblies to be run in accordance with the law and for Courts 
to avoid sanctioning illegality under the pretext of “avoiding absurdities.” Accordingly, he 
correctly held that in the absence of Councillors an Assembly cannot be deemed to be 
lawfully constituted. Consequently, it cannot legally levy and collect taxes.159 
3.3 Processes and mechanisms 
3.3.1 The duty to ensure public participation 
Section 3(2)(d) of the EMA obliges persons that are required by law to perform environment 
management functions to take necessary steps and measures for “promoting public awareness 
and participation in the formulation and implementation of environmental and conservation 
policies of government.” This suggests that environmental agencies have a general duty to 
ensure public participation in policy and rule formulation processes.  However, specific 
provisions of the EMA do not generally impose procedural constraints or obligations on 
environmental rule-making by designated agents. The only exceptions are provisions which 
require the Minister to make prescribe rules and standards based on the recommendations of 
the NEC.160 The EMA also requires the Minister to consult lead agencies when taking 
environmental management measures.161  
The Local Government Act, however, contains inbuilt mechanisms to facilitate public 
participation in the development of by-laws. Section 104 of the LGA makes provision for the 
procedures to be followed when making by-laws. These include the requirements for Councils 
to seek Ministerial approval and to invite objections from the public before implementing by-
laws.162  Subsection 2 of the section requires Councils to publish a notice of intention to apply 
for approval of by-laws to be published in the Gazette and local newspapers that circulate in 
the area to be governed by the by-laws. The notice is supposed to “include representations in 
writing from any person wishing to make any observation upon or an objection to such 
proposed by-law.”163 Subsection (3) obliges local authorities to ensure that copies of by-laws 
are open to public inspection 14 days prior to the submission of an application for approval. 
                                                          
157 Page 34 of the transcript. 
158 HC Civil Cause No. 63 of 2006.  
159 Page 37 of the transcript. 
160 Sections 8(2), 24(1), 30(1),31,36(1) 
161 Sections 8(1),  
162 Section 104(1) 
163 Section 104(2) 
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This provides an opportunity for members of the public to make observations upon or 
objections to the by-laws. 
3.3.2 Stakeholder Consultation and Public participation in rule making 
 
As noted above, the EMA obliges duty bearers to promote public awareness and participation 
in the formulation of environmental policies. According to evidence from this study, this 
requirement seems to be strictly adhered to by environmental agencies in practice. For 
example, the respondents  noted  that the Minister generally adhered to the EMA which 
requires him/her to consult Lead Agencies or NCE before making rules. Other stakeholders 
are also routinely consulted.  Those responsible for approving policies and rules also routinely 
check whether policy or rule development processes adhered to consultation requirements.  
But what is still not clear whether agencies operate in this manner because they believe that 
stakeholder involvement in rule-making is useful and beneficial or merely to satisfy legal or 
procedural requirements.  
The process for consultation is generally top-down. Usually, the consultations initially involve 
a narrow set of purposively selected key informants, and are subsequently expanded to 
involve wider stakeholders. Specifically, those that are first consulted include lead agencies, 
line ministries, academics, parliamentary committees and CSOs. The public is usually 
consulted through Traditional Authorities. After these consultations, a document is formulated 
and sent to Ministry of Justice for its input before being taken it to cabinet.  
The above process is designed to ensure that the views of stakeholders are taken into 
consideration in the rulemaking process. However, in practice consultations tend to usually 
involve a narrow set of stakeholders and hardly involve new voices. The democratic 
credentials of traditional leaders as community representatives are also questionable. 
An important concern of most respondents, however, was the fact that there is no systems for 
ensuring that public contributions are not unjustifiably disregarded in the rule making 
processes. There is also no system for challenging the rules on the basis that the contributions 
of the public were not considered. 
4. RULE APPLICATION -  
4.1. Actors 
The EMA provides for a number of duty-bearers who are responsible for the implementation 
of environmental law and policy in Malawi. These include the Minister, the Director of 
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Environmental Affairs, District Environmental Officer and Environmental Inspectors. 
Sectoral laws also confer specific rule application duties on various lead agencies that are 
charged with environmental management responsibilities. However, as noted above, apart 
from the Department of Environmental Affairs, there are more than 15 lead agencies 
responsible for rule application in the environmental arena.164 These include the departments 
of Forestry, Fisheries, National Parks and Wildlife, and Mining  
Various laws also empower local authorities to perform environment management functions. 
These laws have mandated City, Town, Municipal and District Councils to apply and 
implement environmental rules. The EMA has also provided for environmental offices at 
district level. These offices are managed by District Environmental Officers provided for 
under Section 20 of the Act. However, it is not clear how this office relates to the Director of 
Environmental Affairs and other offices at District level within the framework of devolution. 
The LGA imposes a number of environmental management functions on Councils.165 Sectoral 
laws also delegate some environmental rule-application functions to local government 
agencies and communities.166  
The Department of Environmental Affairs is primarily a coordinating agency. The daily 
implementation of environmental management functions is the responsibility of Lead 
Agencies. This view finds support in section 6 of the EMA which provides that the provisions 
of the EMA should not be interpreted as divesting lead agencies of powers, functions, duties 
or responsibilities conferred upon them by relevant environmental legislation. 167 The above 
institutional framework is designed to ensure that there is effective coordination of 
environmental management at all levels.  
However, the findings of this study suggest otherwise. This multiplicity of agencies with 
conflicting, overlapping and inconsistent mandates has posed a barrier to effective 
                                                          
164 These Lead Agencies administer and enforce environmental laws relating to water, air, land, fisheries, 
forestry, national parks and wildlife, pollution and waste management , and public health. 
165 Section  6 and the Second Schedule. 
166 Part III of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act provides for local community participation in the 
conservation and management of fisheries in Malawi; Part IV of the Forestry Act authorizes the Director of 
Forestry to forge forestry co-management agreements with local communities. Part VI of the Act provides for 
participatory management of customary land forests by local communities; Part III A of the National Parks and 
Wildlife Act provides for the involvement of Local Communities and the Private Sector in the conservation and 




environmental coordination and management in Malawi.168 It has also posed obstacles to 
legality, rationality and procedural propriety of the functions of environmental agencies.  
 
In terms of legality, this study has found that the current structures for coordinating the 
implementation of environmental rules are hardly doing what they are legally mandated to do. 
One such structure is the NCE whose weaknesses have been alluded to above.  Under section 
12(3) of the EMA the Council is primarily charged with the task of recommending measures 
necessary for the harmonization of mandates of Lead Agencies. But evidence from this study 
suggests that the NCE rarely does that.  Of particular concern of some respondents was that 
representatives of Lead Agencies on the NCE primarily focus on defending narrow sectoral 
interests as opposed to resolving cross-sectoral conflicts. This invariably affects the NCEs 
effectiveness as a coordinating agency. The NCE’s effectiveness is also undermined by the 
fact that it has no policymaking powers and its decisions are subject to the Minister, who is a 
politician.  
One of the major criticisms advanced against the current state of environmental management 
is that its legal framework contradicts what was envisaged by the National Environmental 
Policy (NEP). The NEP provides that “the environmental affairs institution should be seen as 
a professional body whose opinions are considered as such and should be beyond political or 
business intrigue.” The low-level status of the EAD and its lack of independence from the 
executive branch undermine its capacity to coordinate environmental management and to 
enforce the law.169  The fact that the EAD is mandated to police more powerful agencies with 
an exploitative interest in environmental resources further complicates its position. Sectoral 
laws also fail to give the office of the Director of Environmental Affairs the prominence it 
deserves.  For example, the laws do not include the office of the Director of Environmental 
Affairs in their multi-sectoral Boards or Committees.170 This is problematic given that the 
Director’s role is to coordinate the activities of all sectors pertaining to the environment.  
                                                          
168 Part VI of the National Parks and Wildlife Act empowers the Wildlife Research and Management Board to 
conduct Environmental Impact Assessment. This part overlaps with Part V of the EMA, but does not make any 
cross-reference to it. It is therefore not clear how the wildlife impact assessments conducted under this part 
relate to the EMA. 
169 GZ Banda 
170 This is with the exception of the Wildlife Research and Management Board which includes the Director of 
Environmental Affairs (section 17 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act).  
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Another critical concern of most respondents in this study was the problem of incomplete 
devolution of environmental functions to local authorities.  In particular, the decentralization 
policy has led to the creation of local level institutions that are responsible for environmental 
management. But the DEA has been slow to devolve its functions to local level institutions 
and still centralizes too many powers.  For example, the EMA establishes the position of 
District Environmental Officer (EDO) who, ideally, should be part of District Administration.  
The EDO ideally is supposed to report to the District Commissioner (DC). However, most of 
the respondents to this study were not clear as to how this office relates to both the Director of 
Environmental Affairs and District level agencies within the framework of devolution. But in 
practice the EDO is more aligned with EAD than the DC. According to the respondents DCs 
do not recognize EDOs as part of their staff. The organogram of  District Councils do not 
officially include the EDO. EDOs are taken as independent technical staff. The office is 
directly funded by the Department of Environmental affairs which is also responsible for 
auditing the accounts of EDOs. Monthly reports  of the EDOs are sent to the Director of 
Environmental Affairs.  The Director of Environmental Affairs liases with EDOs directly and 
sometimes through the DCs who have nominal authority over them.  This potentially 
undermines lower level rule-application functions because it creates dual administration 
systems at district level. As O’neill and others note, dual administration at district level is 
problematic because it results in “unclear mandates, multiple reporting lines and weak 
accountability mechanisms.”171 
This is problematic  considering that Section 19 of the EMA gives the EDO supervisory 
powers over the District Executive Committees (DECs) on  environmental matters. DDCs are 
an integral part of the decentralisation framework.   
The absence of local authorities between 2005 and 2014 magnified the problem of inadequate 
coordination in environmental rule application at local level. 
4.2. Roles 
Section 8 of the EMA imposes the overall duty of environmental management upon the 
Minister, but obliges him/her to act in consultation with lead agencies. The specific duties of 
the Minister under section 8 include issuance of licences and permits, receiving and 
                                                          
171 Tam O’neill, et al (2014), Fragmented Governance and Local Service Delivery in Malawi, (ODI); O’neill et 
al highlights the pitfalls of dual administration, including multiple reporting lines. According to them dual 
administration affects “accountability relationships, performance management and loyalties within local 
government. “ p25. It also  enhances the prospect of “coordination failures, as do the multiple streams and actors 
within local government.”p32. 
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investigation of complaints relating to the management of the environment, coordination and 
monitoring of all environmental management activities, and preparing plans and developing 
strategies for environmental management. Other duties of the Minister include approval of 
projects following environmental impact assessments, declaration of environmental protection 
areas and protection of biological diversity. The Minister is also a licensing authority 
responsible for granting licences and permits under the Biosafety Act.172 Obviously, these far 
reaching powers and duties make the Minister a good candidate for judicial scrutiny.  
The EMA obliges the Minister to consult Ministers responsible for particular segments of the 
environment in performance of his duties.173 It also authorizes the Minister to delegate some 
of his functions to the Director.174 
The Director’s Office has wide ranging functions and powers under the EMA. It is 
responsible for the administration of the Act. The Director is responsible to the Minister for 
the proper discharge of his/her functions under the EMA. He/she is also responsible for the 
implementation of such environmental policies as may be determined and delegated to him by 
the Minister.175 The Director heads the Department of Environmental Affairs which is 
charged with the responsibility of coordinating environmental management. The specific 
duties of the Director include implementation and enforcement of Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) laws and regulations, enforcement of environmental audit requirements, 
preparation of environmental protection plans and enforcement of environmental protection 
orders, as well as closure of premises where violations occur.176 The Director is also 
responsible for the administration of the Atomic Energy and Biosafety Acts.177 
The Act also empowers the Minister to designate some public officers as environmental 
inspectors.178 The main responsibility of Environmental Inspectors is to “monitor and enforce 
measures for the protection of the environment and for the prevention and abatement of 
pollution.”179 The functions of Environmental Inspectors include administration, monitoring 
and enforcement of environmental management, and pollution prevention and abatement of 
                                                          
172 Section 6 of the Biosafety Act. 
173 Section 8(3) 
174 Section 9(2)(b) 
175 Section 9. 
176 Section 72 
177 Section 4 of the Biosafety Act provides that the “Act shall be administered by the Minister responsible for 
Environmental Affairs and such other officers subordinate to him.” 
178 Section 45. 
179 Section 45. 
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measures.180  The EMA thus gives Environmental Inspectors far-reaching powers which make 
them amenable to judicial review. 
The responsibility of environmental management at local authority level falls within the 
mandate of Local Councils. The District Development Committee is charged with the 
responsibility of coordinating environmental management activities of lead agencies and non-
governmental organizations.181  Environment management functions of Councils include 
sanitation and waste management, pollution control, nuisance control and control of 
hazardous material. The idea behind decentralized environmental management is to ensure 
enhance community participation in environmental governance through devolving 
administrative authority at local authority level.182 
One of the cardinal principles of good administration is that those who make decisions should 
have “legal authority for their actions”.183 This study reveals, however, that compliance with 
legislation is not a simple matter in practice. While the mandates of various environmental 
agencies appear clear on paper, the situation is more complex on the ground.  Public officers 
sometimes fail to appreciate statutory powers must only be performed by those who have 
statutory power to do so.  The  involvement of ‘informal’ actors in rule application processes 
(albeit behind the scene) also adversely impacts on the legality of decisions. The case of The 
State v The Secretary For Environment and Climate Change Management, exparte Vijay 
Kumar on Behalf  of the Members of the Plastic Manufacturers Association of Malawi184 (The 
Thin Plastics Ban Case) illustrates the above point.  
On 13 April 2013 the Secretary for the environment made a decision to ban the, production, 
importation and distribution of thin plastics. Through a newspaper notice the Secretary 
informed the general public that from the 30th June 2014 it would be illegal to produce, use 
thin plastics. The notice indicated that non-compliance with the ban is an offence punishable 
by law. Surprisingly, the notice makes no reference to a specific provision of the law that 
authorized the Secretary to ban thin plastics. In response the manufacturers of thin plastics 
appealed to the Minister who extended the ban to 30 June 2015. It is not clear what the legal 
basis of the appeal was. Neither was it clear what law authorized the Minister to extend the 
                                                          
180 Andrew Le Sueur and Maurice Sunkin (1997), Public Law, (Longman) p528. 
181 Section 19. 
182 Ministry of Local Government (2012), Decentralized Environmental Management Guidelines, MOLGLD, 
January 2012. 
183 The Judge over your shoulder (1994), p 7 
184 Judicial Review Cause No.54 of 2014. 
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ban. It is also alleged that the manufacturers appealed to the Head of State. The Secretary 
subsequently issued another advert that the ban was still effective and enforcement action 
would commence. 
In response, the plastic manufacturers commenced legal proceedings to challenge the 
Secretary’s action on the basis that it was unreasonable, ultra-vires, illegal, and violated the 
principles of natural justice as well as the right to reasons.  
The ban has since been given effect, but the case is still in court. However, a number of 
observations may be made. First, this case raises multiple questions of illegality given that the 
public officials involved in this case are not able to point at a law that authorizes them to act 
in the manner they purportedly acted. In fact, the respondent’s advice merely states that “the 
ban is an implementation of a policy issue that affects a wider group than the Applicants and 
has been a subject of sustained consultations between Government and all stakeholders prior 
to” its implementation. This does not respond to the question whether the EMA authorises the 
Secretary of Environmental Affairs to impose a ban on thin plastics. Interestingly, the 
Applicant’s affidavit also fails to raise this issue as an aspect of illegality and concentrates on 
whether the Secretary’s action to reverse the extension for the commencement date of the ban 
was legal.  This is problematic considering that both the Minister and Secretary do not seem 
to have any legal basis for the powers they used in this case. The use of informal appeal 
structures by plastic manufacturers also raises questions of legality. 
Another classic demonstration of illegality is the case of The State v Parliament 
(Parliamentary Committee on Natural Resources, Environment and Climate Change) and 
others, ex-parte Stephen Phiri.185 The applicant in this case acquired hardwood which he 
wanted to export to China.  The Department of Forestry duly granted him a Forest Produce 
Export Licence to export the same. The applicant subsequently cleared export duty for the 
consignment and embarked on the process of exportation of the wood to China. However, the 
consignment was stopped at the Mozambique Border on the basis that the Parliamentary 
Committee on Natural Resources, Environment and Climate Change had issued a verbal 
suspension on all hardwood exportation licences. In response, the applicant requested the 
Director of Forestry to waive the suspension in his favour because the exportation process had 
already started and hence the ban could not be enforced retrospectively. The Director sought 
approval for the waiver of the ban from the Principal Secretary, which was duly granted. 
                                                          
185 Judicial cause No.20 of 2015 
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However, MRA and Forestry officers at the Border refused to comply with the directive of the 
PS. The applicant commenced judicial review proceedings against the above defendants.  The 
Court quashed the ban on the basis that the Parliamentary Committee had no power to make 
such an order. The judge also ruled that the decisions of the Forestry and MRA officers were 
unreasonable. This case obviously involved multiple breaches of section 43 of the 
Constitution. 
Another worrisome trend that this research found was that sometimes courts condoned illegal 
conduct by environmental agencies by reference to what can be termed “necessary illegality”. 
This has the potential to undermine the entrenchment of a culture of legality. The case of Diab 
Properties Ltd and Lilongwe City Council v Rui Francisco,186 illustrates this point. Rui 
Francisco applied for an injunction against Lilongwe City Council to order Diab properties to 
stop constructing a shopping complex pending judicial review proceedings. One of the 
grounds of the application was that Diab Properties had not conducted an environmental 
impact assessment before the commencement of the project. The Court, however, set aside the 
injunction on the basis that failure to conduct an EIA was not so fatal to warrant the 
demolition of the complex. The Court took account the fact that Diab Properties had invested 
K20 Million Kwacha in the project and that it would be imprudent to throw that money down 
the drain. The Judge observed as follows: “ a reasonable state institution would first weigh the 
overall investment benefit to the nation before condemning DPL.”187 He concluded that the 
social and economic benefits of the project far outweighed the inconvenience that Rui 
Francisco would suffer.  
It is obvious from the above that the judge misdirected himself as to the issues raised by this 
question. Consequently, he failed to vindicate the rule of law. The EIA requirement is not a 
requirement of convenience. It is a legal requirement aimed at preventing serious 
environmental degradation. Section 26(3) of the EMA prohibits licensing authorities from 
issuing licences to developers whose projects have not satisfied the EIA requirements. The 
judge therefore condoned illegal activity by setting aside an injunction in favour of a 
developer who had clearly broken the law. 
This study also unearthed perceptions that courts and environmental agencies are sometimes 
reluctant to stop illegal conduct where doing so would inconvenience powerful actors within 
the system. The case of Ismail Khan and Kamulepo Kalua v African Parks Network Limited  
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and others188 was often cited as an example. The case involved community members and 
interest groups who had obtained an injunction against the translocation of elephants from 
Phirilongwe in Mangochi District to Majete Wildlife Reserve by African Parks. The 
translocation exercise had received endorsement from the government and some traditional 
leaders. However, the applicants opposed the translocation on grounds that it was conducted 
without consulting the local community and without any Environmental and Wildlife Impact 
Assessment. The applicants also argued that every Malawian had the right to “enjoy the 
environment, life and economic activity” and that the translocation of elephants would 
seriously jeopardize if the elephants were translocated.  The court vacated the injunction. In 
the process, it considered whether the translocation process complied with Wildlife Impact 
Assessment and Environmental Impact Assessment requirements stipulated in the National 
Parks and Wildlife Act and the Environment Management Act respectively. The Court held 
that the section 23 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act clearly stipulated that “it is ‘any 
person’ not necessarily the State who may request that such impact assessment be 
conducted.”189 Accordingly, the Court held that in this case the applicants could not complain 
because there was nothing in their affidavits to suggest that “such an assessment was 
requested or that indeed if it was, the same was refused.”190 The Court also dismissed the 
contention that an environmental impact assessment was supposed to be conducted before 
translocating the elephants. It observed that section 24 of the Environment Management Act 
required an EIA if the responsible Minister specified in the Gazette the types and sizes of 
projects which could not be implemented in the absence of an EIA. The Judge observed that 
he could not enforce EIA provisions on this project because there was nothing in the affidavits 
to show that the area in question was specified and gazetted as an area “for which an impact 
assessment has to be done before any project is carried out.”191   
It should be noted that the Judges reasoning in the above case was rather faulty. Section 24 
gives discretion to the Minister to specify the types and sizes of projects which should not be 
implemented without an EIA. However, it does not require the Minister to specify and gazette 
areas for which EIAs should be conducted. In any case, the translocation of elephants 
Phirilongwe clearly fell within the provisions of the Environment (Specification of Projects 
                                                          
188 High Court Civil Cause Number 1185 of 2005 (Unreported). 
189 P14 of the Transcript; Section 23 provides that “any person who has a good and sufficient reason to believe 
that any proposed or existing government process or activity of the government or any other organization or 
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Board, the Minister that an environmental impact assessment be conducted.” 
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Requiring Environmental Impact Assessment) Notice.192 The notice, among others, provides 
that an EIA is required for:  
Projects in proximity to or which have the potential to affect national parks, game 
reserves or protected areas. 
What is particularly interesting in this case is that the Judge found that an EIA was 
unnecessary even though Phirilongwe is a forest reserve in close proximity to Lake Malawi 
National Park.  Unsurprisingly, some respondents felt that some respondents felt that the 
Judge could not enforce the law in this case because of powerful corporate and political 
interests associated with the translocation of elephants. In this regard the respondent observed 
as follows: 
 “ I attended the hearing, but the judge summarily vacated our application for an 
injunction without any reference to the need for an EIA as stipulated in the 
Environmental Management Act, upon which we had based our submission. To me, it 
looked like it had all been predetermined and nothing we could do would shake them - 
much to my profound sorrow.”193 
4.3. Processes and mechanisms 
The principles of legality and procedural propriety require that environmental agencies must 
comply with procedures stipulated in the Constitution, enabling statutes and regulations when 
applying rules. Where applicable agencies must also apply procedures provided by the 
common law. Failure to do so exposes public officers to challenges of illegality and 
procedural impropriety. 
However, failure to pay attention to the meaning of rules was evident from this study. It is not 
uncommon for agencies to adopt procedures that do not are not in compliance with required 
procedures. The EIA approval process is a case in point. Section 25 of the Act gives the 
Director the responsibility of recommending EIA approvals to the Minister. However, this 
study established that in practice EIA reports are reviewed by the TCE which sends its 
recommendations to the NCE. The reports are then referred to the Minister after approval by 
NCE.  This procedure raises questions of legality. According to EIA Guidelines, TCE 
members are entitled to participate in the EIA process and “recommend courses of action to 
                                                          




the Director.” 194 However, according to the Guidelines, the Director has discretion whether to 
follow the advice of the TCE or not, “he is not bound by it.”195 The statutory responsibilities 
to regulate the EIA process are conferred on the Director and the Minister. The TCE and NCE 
are only supposed to perform advisory roles. Failure to pay careful attention to the meaning of 
the Act and the Guidelines leads to the above illegality. Moreover, the guidelines are vaguely 
drafted and not well aligned with the EMA. 
Serious lapses of procedural propriety were also evident from the study. In The State v 
Lilongwe Town Planning Committee &Ors ex parte Mirza, 196 the government designated a 
certain area in Lilongwe as new City Centre and indicated that land would be available for 
lease. Applicant applied for a lease of part of the land and the City Council allocated the land 
to him. He incurred K18 million on the development of the land and US48000 on consultants. 
When he submitted an application for development permission, the City Council deferred 
consideration of the application under the pretext that it was supposed to approve the layout 
plan prior to granting development permission. In the interim he was still required to pay 
ground rentals. Subsequently, after persistent reminders, he was allocated a smaller plot in a 
different location. He commenced proceedings against the City Council. It was held that the 
function of the Court was to ensure that lawful authority is not abused by unfair treatment. 
The judge observed that any reasonable person directing his mind to this case would conclude 
that failure by the respondents to lift a notice of deferment for over 60 months amounted to 
procedural impropriety towards the applicant meriting reversal of the decision of the City 
Council. Similarly, the judge ruled that the decision to defer making a decision for five years 
was unreasonable and in bad faith. Justice Chombo held that the 1st respondent had the right 
to defer making a decision in accordance with Section 37(3) of the Town and Country 
Planning Act. However, the impropriety was characterised by “failure to inform the applicant 
of the progress of the application and the likely date on which the decision will be taken.” 197 
The Judge also classified other forms of conduct on the part of the defendants as procedural 
impropriety. These includes failure to consult or notify the Applicant before allocating a new 
plot to him and collecting land rentals from him prior to making a decision.198 
                                                          
194 Paragraph 2.1. The participation may include: reviews of Project Briefs, EIA ToRs and EIA reports, and 
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Another case that raises triable issues relating to procedural propriety is Diab Dairy Farming 
Ltd vs Lilongwe Water Board and Attorney General. 199 In 2005 the plaintiff purchased land 
for purposes of dairy farming from the District Commissioner Lilongwe.  In order to get 
authorization for the establishment of the farm he engaged consultants to conduct an EIA. The 
Minister of Environmental Affairs issued an EIA certificate in favour of the dairy farm project 
in 2006. The Water Resources Board subsequently gave him water rights from the Likuni 
River with the approval of Lilongwe Water Board. Subsequently the Water Board objected to 
the development on grounds that the proposed development was too close to the intake point 
of Lilongwe Water Board and that there was a high potential for water pollution from animal 
waste and an increase in nitrates. The Board also cited “non-compliance with EIA 
requirements as evidenced by sinking borehole and requests to abstract water from Lilongwe 
River” as grounds for the objection. In response the Plaintiff commenced proceedings against 
the Defendants for interfering with its business. In its defence EAD has pleaded that it only 
issues an EIA certificate upon consultation of all stakeholders and on condition that no 
stakeholder raises objections. The EAD states that it no longer supports the project because 
Lilongwe Water Board, a key stakeholder, raised an objection and changed its stance on the 
project. This Commercial Court held that the case was improperly before the Court and 
referred it to the Town and Country Planning Board. Justice Manda observed as follows: 
 “I find it curious that the Department of Environmental Affairs did issue an 
Environmental Impact Assessment Certificate for this project. Thus the question would 
be under what grounds did the Town and Country Planning Committee reject the 
development permission in view of the Environmental Impact Assessment?” 
In other words, this case raises issues of procedural propriety including whether section 43 of 
the Constitution was followed before revocation of planning permission.  
4.4 Public participation in rule application 
4.4.1 Current state  
Principal 10 of the Rio Declaration urges the state to facilitate public awareness and public 
participation in environmental decision making. This requirement is also contained in 
international agreements that are binding on Malawi.200  Courts have also emphasized the 
importance of citizen participation in decision making processes. In the State v Blantyre City 
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200 Article 4(1) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; Article 14(a) of the 
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Council, ex parte Ngwala, Justice Mwaungulu emphasized the “importance and the need for 
public officials, performing public functions and exercising public power to afford citizens, 
notwithstanding public interest concerns, a hearing or some audience, when making decisions 
critically affecting citizens rights.”201 
The EMA contains a number of provisions that aim at facilitating public participation in rule 
implementation and other administrative decision making processes. These include section 3 
(2) which obliges persons required under written laws to exercise environmental management 
functions to take such steps and measures aimed at promoting public participation in the 
implementation of environmental policies. Section 25(3) stipulates that EIA reports shall be 
open for public inspection. This is to facilitate public participation in the EIA process. 
Subjecting EIA reports to public inspection ideally invites interventions from the public on 
the proposed project. Section 26 (1) of the EMA, which obliges the Director of Environmental 
Affairs to invite written or oral comments from the public upon receiving an EIA report. 
Section 26(1)(a) gives the Director discretion to conduct public hearing in order to assess 
public opinion. Section 32 of the EMA empowers the Director to declare any area of Malawi 
to be an environmental protection area. But the section obliges the Director to consider 
representations from persons with sufficient interest in a particular area and the interests of 
local communities in or around the area before taking that measure.202 Failure by decision 
makers to comply with the above requirements may conceivably render their actions subject 
to judicial review.  
However, the EMA falls short of fully domesticating Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration. It 
does not provide for a robust right of access to information, which is intricately connected to 
and instrumental for effective public participation. There is no general right of access to 
information clause under the EMA. Section 52 only provides for access to “information 
submitted to the Director or any lead agency relating to the implementation of the provisions 
of this Act or any other” environmental management law. This raises questions as to whether 
there is a right of access to information that has not been submitted to the Director. The right 
of access to information under the EMA is also restricted. Specifically proprietary 
                                                          
201 Page 1 of the transcript.  
202 Section 32(2)(a) and (g).  
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information can only be accessed if the owner of that information gives prior written 
consent.203  
This is surprising considering that access to information is a constitutional right in Malawi. 204 
Section 37 of the Constitution provides that “Every person shall have the right of access to all 
information held by the State or any of its organs at any level of Government in so far as such 
information is required for the exercise of his or her rights.”  
While commentators have lauded the inclusion of this right in the Constitution, they have 
highlighted a number of problems relating to the way section 37 is couched. First, the section 
restricts the right of access to information to state held information. There is no Constitutional 
right of access to information to information in the custody of private entities. Second, access 
to information can only be guaranteed where it can be shown that the information in question 
is necessary for the exercise of the rights of the person seeking those rights. This means that it 
would not be easy for individuals and groups wishing to champion public interest causes to 
obtain information under this provision. Third, the absence of a mechanism for enforcing the 
right of access to information renders section 37 illusory and practically ineffective. 
Accordingly, the commentators argue for the enactment of legislation to give practical effect 
to the right of access to information. The legislation would provide for more detailed and 
concrete provisions on access to information as well as foster the development of guidelines 
to facilitate access to information.205  
Sectoral laws also provide for public participation in environmental rule application 
processes.206 
In practice, however, there seems to be reluctance to embrace the notion of public 
participation fully. While the law provides an enabling framework community participation- 
                                                          
203 Section 52(2) : “No person shall be entitled to have access to proprietary information (to which the Trade 
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204 Section 37 of the Constitution stipulates that every person has the right to access information held by the State 
and its organs if such information is necessary for the exercise of his or her rights.  
205 CEPA (), Policy Brief: Enhancing Access to Environmental Information and Justice, (Centre for 
Environmental Policy and Advocacy, p 2 
206 Part IIIA of the National Parks and Wildlife Act provides for local community participation and private sector 
involvement in conservation and management of wildlife. Similarly, othe responsibilities of the Director of 
Forestry include promoting participatory forestry and facilitating the formation of village natural resources 
management committees [section 5 (d) and (e) of the Forestry Act; Part III of the Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Act, provides for local community participation in conservation and management of fisheries in 
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the state seems reluctant to entrust the communities with full responsibility. A number of 
factors hamper public awareness in rule application processes. These include inadequate 
access to information on the part of community members,  
The field of EIA presents an interesting case study for the nature and quality of public 
participation in rule application. This is because EIA is an important tool in environmental 
management. The reason why Section 25(3) stipulates that EIA reports shall be open to the 
public for inspection is to ensure that the public participates in EIA decisions.   
In practice, the duty to conduct public consultation falls on EIA consultants. However, there 
was a general understanding on the part of respondents from EAD that there is a mandatory 
duty to make EIA reports open to the public. The respondents also understood that the 
Director has a duty to invite comments from the public and discretion to conduct public 
hearings. The idea is to ensure that public concerns have been addressed in the report and to 
validate the EIA reports. When asked whether the public is actually engaged in prcactice, the 
respondents noted that public consultations are routinely done. But public hearings are 
discretionary.207 The respondents also noted that the Director normally uses newspapers of 
wide circulation to solicit public comments. 
However, there is evidence from this study suggesting that in practice public participation in 
the EIA process is very limited and characterised by lack of meaningful engagement. A 
number of reasons were advanced by the respondents.  Among the factors that hamper public 
participation is the limited public awareness of EIA processes. For example, the EMA 
requires projects for which EIA is mandatory to be published in the Gazette. However, it is 
difficult to imagine how the majority of Malawians who have no access to the Gazette come 
across this vital information. The Gazette is also not widely circulated in Malawi. 
Other factors that undermine meaningful engagement by the public in the EIA process include 
the tendency for local traditional leaders to dominate the discussions and thereby effectively 
suppressing the views of most ordinary people. The democratic credentials of traditional 
leaders as representatives of public opinion are also questionable. Meaningful engagement in 
consultation processes is also hampered by high illiteracy on the part of community members 
and the complexity of environmental issues. This is exacerbated by the fact that community 
members are not given enough information on the possible impacts of particular projects. 
                                                          
207 Examples, were given of intensive public and nationwide consultations that were done in relation to the 
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The respondents from EAD also claimed that EIA reports are placed in strategic places for the public to view. 
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Respondents also noted that sometimes there is donor or political pressure to speed up the 
EIA processes, even where it is not technically feasible to do so. This sometimes undermines 
public participation. The strict deadlines that some donors and development banks give for the 
commencement of their projects effectively leave little time for engaging the public. 
Respondents who had previously consulted the public on the Atomic Energy Bill highlighted 
how meaningless public participation can be on technical issues characterised by scientific 
complexity.  Similarly, the Biosafety registrar recently requested for public submission on the 
general release of Biotech Cotton. It was difficult for the public to engage because of the 
complexity of the issues involved.  
This study also found evidence of methodological, procedural and political challenges that 
undermine the quality of participation. These include the criteria for inclusion and exclusion 
of the members of the public to be consulted. Within the environmental sphere there is a 
tendency to invite like-minded people for public consultations. Similarly, environmental 
agencies place too much reliance on dominant NGOs and traditional leaders. This obstructs 
new voices from contributing to environmental management. 
4.4.2 Recent legal developments 
The EMA, 2016, has recognised the shortfalls in the existing law relating to public 
participation. It contains a stand-alone provision that seeks to strengthen public participation 
in environmental decision-making processes. Section 5 of the EMA, 2016, explicitly makes 
provision for public participation in environmental management. The section imposes a 
number of duties on the authority aimed at ensuring effective public participation in 
environmental management. Specifically, the Authority has the obligation to promote the 
right of access to information and impose a duty on lead agencies, the private sector and 
NGOs to provide such information in a timely manner. The Authority also has a duty to 
promote direct or indirect public participation in environmental decision-making processes.  
6. ADJUDICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTES 
6.1. Actors and roles  
The general mandate to interpret and settle environmental disputes is given to the judiciary. 
However, some laws provide for possibilities of internal adjudicative mechanisms and 
administrative appeals. For instance, Section 69 of the EMA establishes an Environmental 
Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) which is supposed to consider appeals against the decisions 
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of the Minister, Director or Inspector under the EMA.208 The provision establishes the which 
is a quasi-judicial body comprising a Chairperson who is suitably trained and qualified in 
environmental management and two other persons who are sufficiently qualified in 
environmental management. The Chairperson and other members are supposed to be 
appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Minister.209 The Tribunal is 
mandated to handle appeals against any of the following—(a) actions or decisions of the  
Minister, Director or inspector Act;(b) the rejection of licence applications  by the Minister or 
Director;(c)the revocation of licences issued  by the Minister or Director;(d) the closure of 
premises. The Tribunal is also mandated to handle such other issues relevant to environmental 
management and sustainable use of resources as may be referred to it by the Director or other 
persons. 
The Tribunal, however, has not been established despite passage of 18 years since the EMA 
was enacted. The reasons for this status quo are not clear. Some commentators, however, 
attribute the non-establishment of the tribunal to resource constraints. Considering that this is 
speculative and warrants further investigations, the present study sought out to determine the 
reasons for the non-establishment of the Tribunal. 
Another administrative appeal mechanism is found in section 5(2) of the EMA which gives 
any person who believes that his or her right to a clean or healthy environment has been 
violated the option of filing a written complaint to the Minister instead of commencing High 
Court proceedings.  The provision requires the Minister to institute an investigation into the 
matter complained of within thirty days from the date of the complaint. The Minister is also 
obliged to respond to the complainant within the same period “indicating what action the 
Minister has taken or shall take to restore the claimant’s right to a clean and healthy 
environment.” The Minister’s actions may include instructing the Attorney General to take 
appropriate legal action.  
A major drawback of this provision is that this procedure is only accessible to those who have 
reasons to believe that their rights have been violated. It does not accommodate those who 
may want to file an appeal in the public interest. 
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Moreover, the Section 5(2) procedure seems to have been of little value to Malawians because 
there appears to be no record of its use. This study therefore sets out to investigate why this is 
the case. 
6.2 Processes  
6.2.1. Public participation in the adjudication process 
The effectiveness of judicial review as a tool for promoting environmental accountability largely 
depends on the participation of a wide range of affected interests in the adjudication process.210 In 
order to participate effectively in environmental management, citizens need to be guaranteed the right 
of access to courts and tribunals to enable them to challenge environmental An important issue, once 
thought settled, that is again controversial is whether citizen groups as opposed to individual 
citizens) would have the right to commence proceedings for infringement of the right to a 
clean and healthy environment. However, Malawi like other common law jurisdictions has 
traditionally required applicants to demonstrate a degree of sufficient interest in a matter in 
order to have standing to challenge an action by a public agency.  This makes  it difficult for 
public-spirited individuals/entities “of all sizes and resource levels” to challenge unfair rules 
and raise them for public scrutiny in the absence of liberalized standing decisions. 
rules as well as reasonably accessible and low cost access to courts.211 The standing 
requirement may, therefore, prove to be a substantial hurdle to citizen participation in 
environmental management. 
Section 15 of the Constitution provides as follows:  
 
“Any person or group of persons, natural or legal, with sufficient interest in the 
promotion, protection and enforcement of rights under this Chapter shall be entitled to 
the assistance of the courts, the Ombudsman, the Human Rights Commission and other 
organs of the Government to ensure the promotion protection and enforcement of those 
rights and the redress of any grievances in respect of those rights.”  
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Section 5 of the EMA provides for the right to a clean and healthy environment. It also 
stipulates that for purposes of enforcing this right, “any person may bring an action in the 
High Court.” 
Commentators seem to disagree on the meaning of the above provision. The major bone of 
contention is whether the provision allows for a fairly flexible approach to locus standi. One 
school of thought argues that the flexibility of the wording of this section would embrace 
persons who have not suffered direct violation of the right to a decent environment. Public-
spirited entities, including environmental NGOs, may consequently be allowed to commence 
proceedings under this provision.212  Conservative scholars, however, contend that the way 
the provision is currently “drafted raises serious doubts as to whether indeed environmental 
NGOs can have locus standi to bring an action where no directly affected individuals come 
forward to commence legal proceedings.”213 Proponents of this school contend that the words 
“any person” in this section have a hidden meaning. As a result judges may adopt a common 
law interpretation which might restrict the meaning of the words ‘any person’ to “ a person 
who has suffered harm.”214 
The above doubts are reinforced by the  fact that the original draft of the EMA Bill provided 
for the right to enforce the right to a clean and healthy environment without the need to 
establish standing. The provision was revised due to concerns by senior government lawyers 
that removal of the standing requirement from the Bill would open floodgates of litigation and 
eventually clog the court with cases.215 Tracy Dobson argues that the inclusion of a restrictive 
standing clause in the EMA potentially stifles the participation of interest groups in the 
adjudication process because it places the sole responsibility of enforcement of environmental 
regulations on government. She argues that this is problematic considering that “government 
enforcement of environmental regulations is extremely limited and viewed with great hostility 
by local people.”216 
However, the only judicial interpretation of section 5 seems to indicate that courts may be 
willing to interpret this provision liberally. In The Administrators of the Estate of Dr H 
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Kamuzu Banda v The Attorney General, 217  Justice Chimasula held that the right to a clean 
and health environment was not localised and the words ‘any person’ should be interpreted 
liberally. He observed as follows:  
“In recognition of the pressing need to preserve the environment, the Environment 
Management Act has given locus standi to 'any person' to bring suits to enforce the 
right to a clean and healthy environment, which right is, of course, also not 
localized.  In a nutshell, the Environmental Management Act departs from orthodox 
requirements for locus standi and gives any person the right to involve himself or 
herself in environmental litigation.”218 
While justice Chimasula’s position represents a progressive approach to standing.  Justice 
Chimasula’s position represents a progressive approach to standing. This approach has been 
incorporated into the recently enacted revised Environment Management Act (EMA, 2016). 
Section 4 of the EMA, 2016 provides for the right to a clean and healthy environment and the 
duty to safeguard and enhance the environment. In order to ensure that this right is realised in 
practice, the section entitles persons who are interested in enforcing the right to a clean and 
healthy environment to commence legal proceedings against persons whose activities are 
potentially deleterious to the environment.219 The most significant reform to the law of 
standing in environmental law is section 4(5) of the EMA, 2016. The subsection stipulates as 
follows: 
Any person proceeding under subsection (4) shall have the capacity to bring an 
action notwithstanding that the person cannot show that the defendant’s act or 
omission has caused or is likely to cause him any personal injury. 
The subsection contains two proviso aimed at avoiding floodgates of litigation. These are that 
the legal action must not be frivolous and vexatious and must not be an abuse of court 
process.220  
The EMA, 2016 is not yet in force and cannot be invoked in a court of law. However, once it 
comes into force, it will bring the much needed certainty to controversies around standing in 
environmental law. It will also open up opportunities for environmental NGOs and public 
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220 Section 4(5)(a) and (b) 
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spirited individuals to use their competences and expertise to promote good governance and 
the rule of law in the environmental sector.  
In the interim, the status quo remains. The Administrators of the Estate of Dr H Kamuzu 
Banda v The Attorney General, still remains the best precedent that environmental activists 
can rely on in order to promote the right to a clean and healthy environment. The decision of 
the Supreme Court in the Case of Civil Liberties Committee v The Minister of Justice and 
Registrar General,221 suggests that courts may be more willing to embrace a liberal approach 
where the concerned NGO specializes in the promotion and protection of a particular right.222   
An alternative mechanism which would have facilitated public participation in the 
adjudication process would have been the Environmental Appeals Tribunal. This is especially 
because it presents a cost effective alternative to litigation which is generally costly and time 
consuming. However, as observed above the Tribunal has not been operationalized after 
almost two decades of its establishment. The reasons why it has not been made operational 
are not yet clear. But it would appear that there is no political will on the part of government 
to set it up. This is evidenced by the fact that in the 2007/2008 financial year parliament 
allocated MK60000 to the Tribunal. This was described by commentators as ‘mockery’ 
considering its expected composition and mandate.223  
6.3 Judicial review and its impact 
Commentators have noted that the “impact of judicial review cannot be isolated from the 
purpose ascribed to it.”224 In this regard, court decisions are an important source of primary 
data on the purpose of judicial review.  This is because when determining judicial review 
matters judges offer great insights on what they consider to be the role and impact of judicial 
review.   
                                                          
221 M.S.C.A., Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1999. 
222 "It is the view of this court that the appellant is unable to establish locus standi even upon a 
liberal interpretation of the term sufficient interest recommended in the World Development 
Movement case…There are other organizations which could, in our view, successfully show that 
they possess the required sufficient interest in the subject matter or outcome of the present 
action. The proper organizations would include the Media Council of Malawi, the National Media 
Institute of Southern Africa (Namisa) and the Journalists Association of Malawi (Jama). These 
organisations, unlike the appellant, are specifically concerned with the rights and freedoms 
relating to the press, and we are of the view that such organizations could successfully claim 
sufficient interest in terms of section 15(2) of the Constitution."   Tambala J 
223  
224 Cane, p12. 
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Malawian Courts have repeatedly observed that the purpose of judicial review is to ensure the 
fair treatment of applicants and that lawful authority is not abused by unfair treatment.225 
Beyond individual applicants, courts have held that judicial review aims to ensure 
transparency in decision making and that relevant authorities use their powers in a proper 
manner.226   Judicial review also aims at controlling executive action in order to ensure that 
public officers act legally, rationally and follow proper procedures.227 There is thus a general 
belief that judicial review of agency rule-making, application and adjudication aims to 
stimulate good governance. This is by ensuring that agencies comply with the principles of 
legality, rationality and procedural propriety. 
Representatives of CSOs that we interviewed tended to consider judicial review as a way of 
bringing issues onto the national political agenda. According to them, the publicity that 
accompanies judicial review ensures that issues at stake are discussed in the public domain. 
This in turn influences the way public officials make their decisions.  
Against this backdrop, this study set out to inquire whether indeed judicial review achieves 
what the judges and commentators claim to be its objectives and purposes. To investigate 
whether judicial review had any impact on the practical operations of environmental agencies 
we asked the respondents the following questions:  whether the prospect of judicial review 
influenced public officer to adjust their behaviour in order to align it with the principles of 
legality, rationality and procedural propriety.    
One challenge that was experienced in this study, however, was failure by some respondents 
to grasp the meaning of the term ‘judicial review’ and to distinguish it from other forms of 
litigation against environmental agencies. However, the researchers mitigated this problem by 
clarifying the meaning of judicial review to the respondents and guiding the respondents to 
focus on judicial review as opposed to other forms of litigation.  The following sections 
present finding that correspond to these questions.  
                                                          
225 Gable Masangano v Attorney General and Others, [2009] MLR 171; Du Chisiza v Minister of Education and 
Culture, [1993] 16(1)MLR 81; Jamadar v Attorney-General, [2000-2001] MLR 175; Khembo v The State 
(National Compensation Tribunal) [2004]MLR151; Mpinganjira and others v Council of the University of 
Malawi, HC. Civil Cause No. 4 of 1994. 
226 In the matter of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi and in the matter of the removal of MacWilliam 
Lunguzi as the Inspector General of Police and in the matter of judicial review, HC. Miscellaneous Application 
No.55 of 1994; Chawani v The Attorney General [2000-2001] MLR 77 
227 Chawani v The Attorney General [2000-2001] MLR 77;  The State v The Director of Public Prosections  and 
another , exparte Dr Cassim Chilumpha, Misc. Civil Cause No 315 of 2005 (Justice Ansah). 
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Generally, this study found mixed findings relating to the impact of judicial review. While 
some respondents felt that judicial review had generally had a positive impact on 
environmental governance, others thought its impact was negative, yet others were 
indifferent.228 
Respondents who viewed judicial review positively highlighted both the direct and indirect 
impacts of judicial review on the behaviour of public officers. These respondents generally 
observed that judicial review not only influenced the behaviour of public officials directly 
involved in particular disputes but also indirectly affected the behaviour of all other officials 
who were potentially subject to judicial review.  
Specifically, the evidence collected in this study suggests that judicial review generally has a 
positive impact on the behaviour of individual public officers.  Public officers observed that 
they generally complied with court decisions, save for cases that have wider political 
ramifications.  
As regards direct impacts, public officers who had no direct experience of judicial review 
challenges noted that threats of legal challenges generally force them to act cautiously. 
Anticipation of possible challenges compels them to follow proper procedures before making 
decisions that may potentially be challenged. The respondents also noted that anticipation of 
judicial review compels them to engage a little more with potential challengers before 
implementing rules than otherwise.  Of course, some respondents looked at this from a 
negative perspective and observed that the fear of judicial challenges sometimes forced them 
to be more bureaucratic than they should be. This in turn tended to delay decision making and 
implementation processes.   
 One way of determining the impact of judicial review is to consider whether judicial review 
decisions lead to reconsideration of decisions by the original decision-makers.229 In this 
regard, this study found evidence of environmental agencies rethinking their decisions after 
judicial review challenges. For instance, the Department of Environmental Affairs 
                                                          
228 The above findings are in line with existing literature that notes that there are generally three responses that 
agencies generally give to court decisions that require them to change their policies, decisions and processes. 228  
Broadly, the responses can be categorised as positive, neutral or indifferent, and negative. Negative responses 
generally arise when agencies perceive judicial review as an unwarranted obstacle to their mission and objectives 
(See Halliday, p79). 
 
229 Cane, p 11.  
60 
 
promulgated the Environment Management (Plastics) Regulations, 2015, in response to a 
judicial review challenge by plastic manufacturers.  
There were many suggestions from interview responses that judicial review is considered to 
have had significant impacts beyond the parties to specific cases. In particular, the responses 
suggested that judicial review has triggered observable systemic changes in the way public 
agencies make decisions.  In this context, respondents who have served government for more 
than a decade were able to give concrete examples of systemic changes that have taken place 
in government that could be attributable to judicial review. These include changes in internal 
policies, procedures and administrative practices to avoid legal challenges. 
The capacity building initiatives that government has been undertaking in the field of 
administrative law are also attributable to the quickening of judicial review since 1992. For 
example, some respondents noted that the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the President 
and Cabinet regularly organized administrative justice courses for senior government officials 
between 2000 and 2005. The courses, which were facilitated by Judges, the office of the 
Solicitor General and academics, were described as very helpful by respondents. The 
organization of the courses, according to them, was indicative of the impact of judicial review 
and the recognized need on the part of government to build practical capacity in 
administrative law. The development of administrative law manuals for senior public officials 
was also cited as an indicator of the impact of judicial review. The idea behind the above 
capacity building initiatives is essentially to address systemic failures in decision making that 
have been identified in successive judicial review decisions. 
Notwithstanding the above, this study found that individual public officers sometimes failed 
to adjust their behaviour in compliance with court decisions because they were subject to 
diverse influences and pressures from several sources. This sometimes effectively eroded the 
impact of judicial review.   
The findings of this study also reveal that, contrary to conventional wisdom, judicial review 
may have unintended negative side-effects on the behaviour of some bureaucrats. For 
example, some technocrats have developed a negative attitude against judicial review and 
view is an interference with technocratic autonomy by Judges who do not understand 
environmental science.  Opponents of judicial review also decried the growing trend towards 
‘judicialization’ of government, as evidenced by the ever growing increase in the number of 
challenges against public authorities. They equated judicial review to inappropriate judicial 
61 
 
activism and an undue interference with their technocratic autonomy by judges who had very 
little appreciation of the science which informs environmental management. Similarly, some 
public officials did not seem to appreciate the real value of judicial review and regarded 
judicial review decisions as “mere technicalities.”  
As a result some bureaucrats merely adopted cosmetic practices and procedures in order to 
fulfil the technical requirements that would help them avoid judicial review challenges.  
Evidence of explicit risk taking by agencies was also gathered especially in cases that had 
political implications. Some respondents observed that in the event of a conflict between the 
views of their political superiors and the possible views of courts they were more inclined to 
follow the directives of their superiors and risk judicial review. This study found only one 
case in which a public officer challenged the views of a Minister. 
6.4 “Administrative soup of influences” 
It would be intellectually naive to regard judicial review as the only factor that impacts on 
rulemaking, rule application and rule adjudication. It would also be misleading to think that it 
is “the only or perhaps the most important mechanism of legal accountability.”230 The factors 
that determine the bureaucratic behaviour are multiple and multifaceted.  Sunkin terms these 
factors “an administrative soup of influences in decision-making.”231 A major challenge for 
researchers who want to determine the impact of judicial then becomes how to determine the 
relative significance of judicial review in influencing agency behaviour. A study of the impact 
of judicial review would thus not be complete without considering other factors that influence 
decisions of public officers. 
Against this backdrop, this study found that political considerations affect the rate and 
direction of rulemaking more than judicial considerations. For example, in 2012 the EAD 
produced a cabinet paper to combat deforestation which proposed the promulgation of rules to 
ban the use of burnt bricks because of their impact on deforestation. However, no progress has 
been made on this proposal because of intense opposition from politicians.232   
                                                          
230 Peter Cane, p18. 
231 M Sunkin, 2004,  ‘Issues in Researching the Impact of Judicial Review’ in M Hertogh & S Halliday 
(eds) Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact, (Cambridge University Press)),p 43 at 71.  
 
232 The reasons for the rejection of this ban include the fact that the idea will be difficult to sell in the absence of 
alternatives. Politicians were also opposed to the ban because on the basis that it was arbitrary considering that 
the Tobacco industry is allowed to use wood for curing tobacco. 
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Political patronage, pressure and interference were also cited among the major factors that 
undermine the ability of public officers to effectively apply environmental law.233 Most 
respondents noted that pressure from politicians was one of the major obstacles to compliance 
with principles of administrative law. The areas that are most prone to political interference 
include the granting of approvals, licences, permits and concessions.234 Similarly, respondents 
observed a worrisome trend whereby persons aggrieved by decisions of designated duty 
bearers lodged appeals with Ministers or even the office of the Presidency. This exposes such 
duty bearers to political pressure.235  
Other factors that were mentioned as adversely impacting on the ability of agencies to comply 
with administrative law principles in their rule application functions included corruption, lack 
of administrative law training/orientation and  
Chronic underfunding was cited as a major challenge that impaired the capacity of EAD to 
apply and enforce environmental law. For instance, it was noted that EIA Guidelines, provide 
that compliance with EIA terms and conditions should be managed through “proper audits 
developed by the TCE and approved by the Director.” 236 However, environmental Inspectors 
fail to monitor compliance with EIA conditions because of inadequate financial capacity and 
technical capacity. Accordingly, it is not uncommon for projects to reach completion without 
being monitored. Resource constraints at national and local levels thus undermined the ability 
of environmental agencies to perform their statutory duties. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study set out to examine the map of environmental agencies in Malawi and to determine 
how these agencies make rules, apply rules and adjudicate on disputes. It also set out to 
examine the nature and extent of public participation in rule making, application and 
adjudication. The study also examined the role and impact of judicial review in environmental 
                                                          
233 An example was cited of the construction of a new Parliament Building where trees were cleared before the 
approval of the EIA report: The Forestry sector was cited as one of the most prone sectors to political 
interference. 
234 Some of our respondents cited examples of projects which were done without EIAs due to political pressure. 
These include the construction of Nkhatabay Hospital (in Kalwe Forest reserve) and the construction of the new 
parliament building in Lilongwe. 
235 In this context one respondent noted: “unless our politicians appreciate the value of the environment in 
Malawi, we are heading nowhere.” 
236 Paragraph, 2.2.4. 
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governance and to suggest possible reforms to the system of environmental governance in 
Malawi. The following section summarises the findings and recommendations of this study.  
(a) One of the defining characteristics of Malawi’s environmental law is that it is diffuse in 
nature. There is no single legal instrument that governs all aspects of environmental 
management. Neither is there a single institution responsible for environmental governance. 
As a result the map of environmental agencies in Malawi is characterised by a multiplicity of 
lead agencies that govern various sectors of the environment. These agencies have 
jurisdictional overlaps and inconsistent mandates. Their legal frameworks are characterised by 
gaps, conflict of mandates, and duplications which hamper the overall effective enforcement 
of environmental law. 
The Environment Management Act was enacted in 1996 to provide an overarching legal 
framework for environmental management in Malawi and to create institutions to coordinate 
environmental management in Malawi. The principal institution for coordinating 
environmental management in Malawi is the Environmental Affairs Department headed by 
the Director. This office, however failed to effectively perform its coordination role because it 
remains weak and lacks the requisite autonomy as well as .political clout to coordinate 
rulemaking, application and adjudication functions. A lot more needs to be done to ensure the 
effective coordination of environmental management in Malawi. 
 (b) The current institutional framework in Malawi inadequately supports coherent 
rulemaking, application and adjudication because of weak cross-sectoral coordination. This 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the current structures for coordinating environmental 
management, including the NCE are hardly doing what they are mandated to do 
(c) The current legal framework for environmental management attempts to create a legal 
framework for stakeholder participation in environmental rule-making, application and 
adjudication. However, it falls far short of creating systems for meaningful engagement of 
stakeholders in the rule-making and application processes. For example, the law contains no 
mechanisms for ensuring the incorporation of stakeholder views in the rule-making and 
application processes. The legal framework also places too many restrictions to access to 
information in the environmental arena.  Neither does it create a system for ensuring that 
stakeholders participate in environmental adjudication without being barred by standing rules. 
Another major weakness of the current legal framework is that it concentrates too much 
power in central government institutions and inadequately devolves some functions to local 
level institutions.  
(d) One tool for promoting access to environmental accountability is judicial review. 
However, the effectiveness of judicial review largely depends on the participation of a wide 
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range of affected interests in the adjudication process. In order to participate effectively in 
environmental management, citizens need to be guaranteed the right of access to courts and 
tribunals to enable them to challenge environmental decisions.  
(e) The impacts of judicial review are complex and multifaceted. On the one hand judicial 
review has had the impact of making officials more aware that their decisions could be 
challenged and thus encouraging them to seek legal advice, to draft their decisions more 
carefully and to be more thorough in internally reviewing decisions. On the other hand 
however, the threat of legal challenges tends to make administrators defensive and compels 
them to adopt procedures which would enable them to demonstrate to the courts (if they were 
challenged) that their decisions had been properly taken. This confirms earlier studies that  
judicial review leads to more bureaucracy, a greater attention to detail, and a greater role for 
lawyers within government.237 
Worse still, some agencies viewed court decisions negatively to the extent that and raised 
questions as to why their technocratic autonomy should be encroached upon by judges who 
had limited knowledge of environmental science and management. 
(f)There are a number of factors that tend to undermine the development of a culture of 
legality, rationality and procedural propriety in environmental agencies. These according 
include outdated legislation, political patronage/ interference, capture of the rule application 
process by the powerful, resource constraints, poverty  and the difficulty of enforcing the law 
without providing alternatives to people whose livelihoods are at stake. 
Against this backdrop, this study makes the following recommendations: 
(a) It would be critical for the law to create a strong statutory framework that would 
facilitate coordinated environmental management, stakeholder participation and 
effective rulemaking, application and adjudication. There is thus a need to create a 
strong and autonomous institution for coordinating environmental management in 
Malawi. This would be in line with the National Environmental Policy which 
stipulates that “environmental management needs a powerful voice not only for 
advocacy for environmental protection and conservation, but also to ensure effective 
cross-sector coordination. This can best be achieved through establishment of a high 
level institution within the government administrative structure.  It accordingly calls 
for the establishment of an environmental affairs institution which “shall be a 
professional body whose decisions are beyond political or business interference or 
manipulation.” 238 In consideration of the perennial problem of political interference in 
                                                          
237 Le Sueur and Sunkin (1997), p98. 
238 Clause 4(1)(d) of the Policy 
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the operations of environmental agencies the policy rightly calls for the creation of “an 
autonomous professional body that can compel lead agencies to comply with their 
mandates and enforce cross-sector environment and natural resources policies. Such a 
body should be appointed by and report to the highest political office to ensure 
political visibility and authority.”239 The establishment of the National Environmental 
Protection Authority under the EMA (2016) may be a step in the right direction. 
(b) The need to operationalize the Environmental Appeals Tribunal is imperative. The 
current setup where aggrieved persons informally lodge appeals with the Minister and 
the Head of State is problematic in that it opens room for political interference in the 
application of rules. 
(c) There is need to build capacity in administrative law at all levels. Government should 
take a keen interest in the professional development of its workers.  
(d) There is also an urgent need for the law to create mechanisms for facilitating active 
participation of local communities and other stakeholders in environmental 
management. The law should create mechanisms for ensuring the consideration of 
views of stakeholders in final decisions. Mechanisms should also be provided for 
providing ensuring accountability and provision of feedback to stakeholders. The law 
should also be amended in line with the policy which calls for a broad rule of legal 
standing (locus standi) to empower persons or institutions to take legal action even if 
they cannot show injury or loss to them arising from the subject matter of the action. 
(e) The law should provide for more decentralisation of environmental management and 
eliminate dual reporting structures at local authority level. 
(f) There is need for harmonization of environmental law to eliminate overlaps, 
duplications and conflicts of mandates.  
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